Fingerprinting a Organization Using Metadata of Public Documents by Mendelman, Karl
  
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
Institute of Computer Science 
Cyber Security Curriculum 
Karl Mendelman 
Fingerprinting a Organization Using Metadata 
of Public Documents 
Master’s Thesis (30 ECTS) 
Supervisor(s): Olaf Manuel Maennel   
 Raimundas Matulevicius 
 
 
  
Tartu 2018 
 2 
 
Fingerprinting a Organization Using Metadata of Public Documents 
Abstract: 
Many companies and organizations use Internet for their business activities to make infor-
mation about their products and services more available for customers. Often those organi-
zations and companies share electronic documents on their websites, such as manuals, 
whitepapers, guidelines, templates, and other documents which are considered as important 
to share. Documents which are uploaded on organizations’ websites can contain extra infor-
mation, such as metadata. 
Metadata is defined as data which describes other data. Metadata associated with documents 
can contain information about names of authors, creators information, documents general 
properties, the name of the server, or path where the document was modified.  Metadata is 
added into documents mainly by automated process when document is created, and if doc-
uments’ metadata is not properly removed before sharing, it could contain sensitive infor-
mation. Usually people are not aware about metadata existence in documents and could 
unwillingly leak information about their organization or about themselves. This information 
can be used for fingerprinting basis or conducting cyber attacks. 
In this thesis paper, electronic documents’ metadata which are shared on Estonian govern-
mental organizations websites were analyzed. More specifically, three institutions’ public 
documents’ metadata were observed in order to identify metadata vulnerabilities that can be 
used for fingerprinting purposes. To achieve that, a fingerprinting method was developed 
and utilized against observed websites. This thesis is divided into two different stages, where 
first stage describes the developed fingerprinting method, and second stage presents the out-
comes of metadata analysis with the developed method. 
The results of the conducted research showed that almost all documents which were ana-
lyzed contained information which could be used for fingerprinting purposes. We processed 
2643 documents, where only 12 documents had metadata properly removed. All other doc-
uments contained pieces of information that describes environment where document was 
created and additionally exposed information that could be used for conducting cyber-at-
tacks.   
This thesis is written in English and is 77 pages long, including 6 chapters, 41 figures and 
26 tables. 
Keywords: 
Metadata, fingerprinting organization, metadata extraction, information gathering, cyber at-
tacks 
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Organisatsiooni kaardistamine kasutades avalike dokumentide 
metaandmeid 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Paljud ettevõtted ja asutused kasutavad äritegevuseks Interneti, et muuta informatsioon enda 
pakutavate toodete ja teenuste kohta kättesaadavamaks. Tihtipeale need ettevõtted ja asutu-
sed jagavad oma veebilehel elektroonilisi dokumente  (näiteks tabelid statistiliste andme-
tega, juhendid, näited ja õpetused, artiklid, blanketid ja muud dokumendid), mida peetakse 
vajalikuks jagada. Dokumendid, mis on veebilehtedel kõigile internetikasutajatele vabalt 
kättesaadavad, võivad sisaldada metaandmeid.   
Metaandmed on andmed, mis kirjeldavad teisi andmeid, ehk metaandmed kirjeldavad do-
kumendi sisu ja dokumendi üldiseid omadusi. Metaandmed on näiteks kasutajanimi, kes 
dokumendi koostas, salvestas, printis või redigeeris, kuid lisaks ka ajatemplid millal eelpool 
mainitud tegevusi tehti. Täiendavalt võib dokumentides olla informatsiooni arvutite ja info-
süsteemide kohta, kus seda dokumenti töödeldi. Metaandmete lisamine dokumentidele toi-
mub valdavalt automaatselt ning kui metaandmeid dokumendist eemaldatud pole, võib do-
kumendi metaandmetesse sattuda tundlikku informatsiooni kasutaja ja asutuse kohta. Me-
taandmete olemasolu dokumendis on paljude kasutajate jaoks teadmata ning nad ei ole tead-
likud, et võivad potentsiaalselt lekitada informatsiooni asutuse või süsteemide kohta, kus 
dokumenti töödeldi. Seda informatsiooni on võimalik kasutada küberrünnakute läbiviimi-
seks või asutuse kaardistamiseks.     
See magistritöö uurib dokumentide metaandmeid, mis on ligipääsetavad Eesti riigiasutuste 
veebilehtedel ning mis on kõigile Internetikasutajatele vabalt kättesaadavad. Täpsemalt on 
vaatluse alla võetud kolme riigiasutuse veebilehel olevad dokumentide metaandmed, et 
välja selgitada, kas nendes peituvat informatsiooni on võimalik kasutada asutuse kaardista-
miseks ja võimalike küberrünnakute teostamiseks. Selle täideviimiseks kasutati kahest eta-
pist koosnevat meetodit. Esimene etapp tugines meetodite välja töötamisel, kuidas asutusi 
kaardistada, kasutades ainult dokumentide metaandmeid. Teine etapp kirjeldas esimeses 
etapis välja töötatud meetodi rakendamisel saadud tulemuste analüüsist ja järeldustest. 
Tehtud analüüsi tulemus näitas, et peaaegu kõik dokumendid sisaldavad metaandmeid, mida 
on võimalik ära kasutada ühel või teisel viisil asutuse kaardistamiseks või küberrünnakute 
läbiviimiseks. Magistritöös analüüsisime kokku 2643 dokumenti, millest 12-nel olid me-
taandmed eemaldatud. Ülejäänud dokumendid sisaldasid informatsiooni kilde, mis kirjelda-
vad keskkonda kus dokumente on töödeldud ja sisaldasid informatsiooni, mida on võimalik 
kasutada küberrünnakute läbiviimiseks.  
Lõputöö on kirjutatud inglise keeles ning sisaldab teksti 77 leheküljel, 6 peatükki, 41 joonist 
ja 26 tabelit. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Metaandmed, elektroonilised dokumendid, küber rünnakud, kaardistamine 
CERCS: P170 
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1 Introduction 
In today’s information age, data is very crucial for every organization. Data is often called 
the oil of the digital era [1]. Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, are giants that 
deal in data and have enormous power to get to know people’s habits, interests, visited 
places, and etc. Many of the customers’ welfare and needs related decisions are made by 
data analysis. Potential data loss for any organization can have very negative impact finan-
cially as well as reputation wise.  
Generally, organizations are aware of the information they reveal through different online 
mediums, but what about the data that is being exposed without the knowledge of the or-
ganization, and which could be crucial from security perspective? One place where this issue 
can appear are public domain webpages, especially documents which are hosted there. Doc-
uments have capabilities to store extra information, such as metadata, and those documents 
can contain hidden information which could be sensitive from security perspective.  
Metadata is a structured description of objects containing certain properties useful to the 
user as well as the program on which the document was created [2]. Classical definition 
about metadata is data that describes other data, or information that is used to describe other 
information. Metadata is used in Office applications to store various types of extra data 
ranging from the document’s author’s name to the last time the document was printed. From 
its nature and definition’s point of view metadata may seem safe to store within the docu-
ment. However, metadata may contain very sensitive information about persons who have 
authored or modified the document [3].  
There are several security issues that should be considered when thinking about metadata. 
Firstly, revealing the name of the document’s author can be used in phishing or brute force 
attacks. Revealing the application’s name and version from document metadata may be 
helpful for conducting potential attacks. For instance, exploits or computer malware often 
targets specific, known to be vulnerable version of an application or software. In addition, 
metadata can expose information about the origin of the document, number of authors, and 
keyboard layouts, which indicate potential nationality.  
1.1 Motivation 
This thesis describes security related issues that metadata can reveal and how metadata in-
formation can expose sensitive information about an organization’s infrastructure.  The rea-
son for conducting this research is lack of awareness. Based on open literature and on results 
that are discussed in Chapter 4, organizations and people are not aware what is in the docu-
ments they share on the Internet. Potentially they could leak sensitive information about 
their organization and themselves without noticing it. Metadata can contain internal servers’ 
IP-s, domain names, database queries, and other information which may seem harmless at 
first [2]. However, it could be essential information for constructing cyber attacks or dam-
aging.  
Former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowed described metadata 
with the following sentence [4]:  
“Metadata is extraordinarily intrusive. As an analyst, I would prefer to be looking at 
metadata than looking at content, because it’s quicker and easier, and it doesn’t lie.”  
Metadata provides descriptive information about the contents or assets. By analyzing and 
processing it, links or patterns between different objects may be exposed. When considering 
metadata in documents, and especially those documents that are accessible on the Internet 
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for everyone, the metadata can present descriptive information not only by content of a doc-
ument but also information about document’s author or his/her organization.   
Conducting metadata extraction and analysis and presenting it, is one way to raise awareness 
about document creators who share documents on the Internet, and for IT managers to im-
plement certain policies to remove metadata from documents. Introducing metadata is one 
of the first starting points to mitigate this widely spread issue.   
This is the first study that aims at cleaning up the webpages by various ministries of Estonia 
from compromising metadata to avoid devastating cyber attacks. Estonia has been one of 
the lead countries in terms of information technologies and cyber security, and in that sense 
needs to play that role further.   
1.2 Problem statement and the contribution 
Generation of metadata can be automatic or manual. Microsoft Office applications can add 
metadata to documents automatically. If people do not remove it manually before sharing 
on the Internet, it is preserved and might contain information about the systems where the 
document was created or modified.  
In 2007 Oracle made study and analyzed randomly downloaded Microsoft Office docu-
ments from various websites [5]. In their study they analyzed 8,846 different documents 
(Word documents, spreadsheets, presentations) and concluded:  
„The results of this study clearly indicate that the issue of metadata and hidden information 
exposure is very real. The occurrence of this information within documents published to the 
Web for broad third-party consumption by organizations with large IT resources raises the 
question of how much sensitive information leaks from organizations every day during the 
course of normal business.“ 
The research showed that they managed to extract sensitive information from documents, 
such as hidden text, embedded objects, comments, paths, network share names, sensitive 
hyperlinks, sensitive include fields, and usernames. Since they downloaded public docu-
ments from several randomly selected websites, it might not be so meaningful. But down-
loading documents from a certain site or domain and conducting metadata extraction and 
analysis may prove to be a different story. Since metadata contains information about soft-
ware versions, printer names, working directories, usernames, operating systems, extracting 
it and analyzing can expose information about targeted organization’s internal network and 
policies.  
Organizations upload many files on their sites for daily business, to make their services 
more available for customers. Often those documents are sales reports, manuals, templates, 
guides, or presentations. Those documents contain extra information which can reveal deli-
cate information about the organization, put it in a financial risk or embarrassing situations 
with costly consequences. Metadata provides private information for basis of fingerprinting 
and getting compromising information without doing any active scans against networks. 
As the metadata’s capabilities to store delicate information and the lack of awareness about 
the risks it can bring, the following hypothesis is posed:  
 “Metadata of published document on Estonian governmental organization websites leaks 
compromising information which aids to conduct cyber-attacks against them”. 
In addition, we describe how this compromising metadata information can be used to create 
cyber attacks and outline possible attack vectors based on extracted information.   
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In order to validate or disproof the hypothesis, this study is logically divided into two stages.  
First stage describes methodology on how to fingerprint an organization by using only their 
public documents’ metadata. Methodology is divided into three sub stages: document gath-
ering, metadata extraction, and metadata analysis. Methodology is described in more detail 
in Section 3. While the first stage focuses on introducing the methodology, the second stage 
presents the results of conducted research, thereby to validate or disproof the hypothesis. 
Section 4 gives overview of the statistical results of the study. Extracted raw metadata in-
formation is in the Appendixes.  
1.3 Scope 
Metadata security issues do not only occur within the public documents. The same problem 
is everywhere where documents are shared and proper metadata removal procedures are not 
implemented. This thesis paper focuses on documents which are hosted on public websites, 
since the data set is freely available and does not need any extra permissions to gather them.  
In this study, the uploaded documents from three Estonian governmental webpages are an-
alyzed. The scope of document types used is the following:  
● PDF documents 
● Microsoft Office documents 
Other document formats are excluded mainly due to the occurrences of other formats being 
very few, according to the study described in Appendix 1.  
Document extensions being analyzed and discussed in this thesis paper are: pdf, docx, doc, 
xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx. Each of those formats are described more thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
The findings and the results are presented in a clearly distinct way, in other words, each 
governmental organization individually.  
1.4 Outline 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
● Section 1: Introduction to the topic, including motivation, problem statement, con-
tribution, and the scope of the study; 
● Section 2: This section gives an overview of metadata and about metadata related 
security incidents, problems and risks metadata can cause. Overview of related 
works. 
● Section 3: This section gives an overview of methodology on how to gather docu-
ments on websites, how to extract metadata from documents, and how to analyze it.  
● Section 4: This section gives an overview of statistical results of the study. In addi-
tion, possible attack vectors were discussed.  
● Section 5: This section discusses recommendations about how to mitigate the prob-
lem.  
● Section 6: This section summarize the results found in the thesis work.  
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2 Background and related work 
This chapter introduces metadata and its terminology, highlighting what it is and why it is 
used. Furthermore, overview of metadata in documents and the risks which it can expose 
are discussed.  
2.1 Background 
Metadata is information which describes other information [6]. The term metadata is used 
in different ways in different communities. Some use it to refer to machine understandable 
information, some use it to refer to records that describe electronic resources. Underlying 
concepts of metadata have been in existence as long as collection of information has been 
organized. For instance, in mid-18th century, photographers described content of picture, 
names, and time, in the logic as it done now in modern digital world.    
There are four main types of metadata [6]:  
● Descriptive metadata – describes resource for purposes like identification and dis-
covery; 
● Structural metadata – indicates how compound objects are put together;   
● Administrative metadata – provides information to help manage resources; 
● Markup languages – mix metadata and content together.  
Metadata serves many purposes such as [2][3][6]: 
 Helps user to discover resource; 
 Organize electronic resources; 
 Supports archiving resources; 
 Supports preservation of resources. 
Metadata has been discussed lately quite actively in the context of electronic information. 
In that sense, metadata describes location, physical attributes, type, and form of the elec-
tronic information. Good example of metadata occurrence in describing electronic infor-
mation is NSA surveillance project where governmental organization collects metadata 
about the phone calls – when a call is made, what number they were made to, where they 
were made from, and how long the calls lasted [7]. Information as such is valuable in the 
sense of detecting patterns between people and trying to understand their behaviour. More 
commonly, metadata is associated with documents and files, containing information about 
the names of authors, creators, properties information about file or document, the name of 
the server, or path where the file or document was saved. In essence, metadata addresses the 
underlying data of who, what, when, where, and how [6].  
In this study, metadata refers to variety of information types which are found inside elec-
tronic documents.  
2.2 Metadata in documents 
Metadata can be simply described as data that describes other data. Microsoft documents 
contain variety of metadata which can include author names, document modifier’s name, 
name of the document, person who printed the document, print and save dates, document 
keywords, comments, hidden information [2][3]. An example of metadata is showed in Fig-
ure 1 where document metadata is viewed using MS Word application (inside application 
navigating file -> properties). This kind of metadata can be added automatically or manu-
ally.   
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Figure 1: From UT website downloaded document metadata observed with MS Word ap-
plication 
When a file is created or modified, document processors populate some descriptive infor-
mation automatically and it depends on the application the document was created with. Most 
of the time, the information is there for a good reason. It is needed by authoring and pub-
lishing tools to store parameters (for instance, author identifiers, printer settings) that are not 
immediately part of the document [8]. It enables other tools and applications to communi-
cate with such parameters. While it is good that automatic information propagating pro-
cesses are working in the background, there is danger that if a user is not aware of the pres-
ence of metadata, private or secret information may be revealed unintentionally. The prop-
agation of unnecessary information may also violate organisational security policies.   
In many cases, files’ metadata contains locations where it was created or modified, giving 
potentially sensitive information about network shares, paths, and/or locations [2]. Metadata 
can be examined with the application that created it. However, some of the information that 
users, applications, or content management tools enrich into files are not observable without 
extra software or approach. In this study, information which is not accessible through appli-
cation interface that created the document, is considered as hidden information. For exam-
ple, author history, comments, track changes, fast save data, embedded objects.   
Microsoft Office supports embedding’s from other Microsoft applications; data from a 
spreadsheet can be embedded into a Word document as an external file. Example of this 
feature is shown in Figure 2. The PowerPoint presentation was downloaded from Estonian 
Tax and Custom Board’s webpage (emta.ee). By disabling read–only protection and observ-
ing graph on the 2. slide and then selecting “Change Data” in the graph context menu, an 
embedded Microsoft Excel source file opens. That file contains all the source data, including 
formulas, graphs, numbers, raw data. Person who uploaded this document probably assumed 
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that data was inaccessible. Situation shown in Figure 2. can be described as potentially un-
intended information disclosure which might cause reputational damage to the organization.  
Figure 2. PowerPoint presentation file, containing a spreadsheet with an abundance of 
source data for current and some other calculations 
Other parties can access internal spreadsheets in that way and see the calculation formulas, 
as well as raw data which might be used only in-house. It is ironic that the embedded spread-
sheet also contains metadata that can expose the name of the person who made the calcula-
tions. Maybe the presentation author does not have the permissions to use that table and 
using metadata one can determine that this presentation author is violating the rules. For an 
attacker, embedding’s information is useful for constructing attacks. For example, one of 
the known advanced persistent threat (APT) techniques is the reuse of legitimate docu-
ments/attachments. Embedding is a good place to receive that document/attachment, infect 
it with malware, and send it to the document’s author.    
Every time a document is opened, edited and saved, metadata is added by the operating 
system, the application itself, and/or through the use of certain automation features [9]. That 
means every document shared on the Web has probably some kind of metadata. The ques-
tion is whether the metadata revealed is harmful or not. For example, the yearbook of 2016, 
that was published by Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO), and can be considered as 
a document made by a very restricted organization, has metadata in it (see Figure 3). Is this 
metadata harmful or not, one cannot tell, but the fact that metadata exists in documents of 
such a level is well-proven. It can be read that the document is created with a software named 
Adobe InDesign and the operating system used was Mac OS.   
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Figure 3. Metadata of KAPO yearbook 
Throughout history there are many cases where seemingly innocuous metadata has caused 
reputational damage to persons or governments. One famous example is “Dodgy Dossier’s” 
case in 2003 [10], in which the United Kingdom’s (UK) government placed a report about 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction on its website. The report document was ultimately used 
by the UK government to justify its involvement in Iraq. The uploaded document was in 
native MS Word format and contained metadata which showed that the document was 
drafted by civilians who had plagiarized the information from a university student’s thesis. 
Furthermore, by deeper analysis of the report document, it was discovered that a large por-
tion of the documents were actually taken from a twelve-year-old PhD thesis [11]. This fact 
raised some flags about quality, authenticity of the report, and caused reputational damage 
to the UK government.  
Second metadata eye-opening event involved American law firm Venable’s client [12]. Ve-
nable was contacted by a company whose vice president had recently resigned. Shortly after 
his exit, the firm lost a contract with a government organization to a competitor – a compet-
itor working with the former vice president. The vice president of the company was accused 
of misusing of trade secrets. The defendant and his new firm provided an MS office docu-
ment (“Sham document”) as evidence for the court; however, they did not take the possible 
metadata into account. Defendant’s evidence document contained timestamp anomalies: the 
document was created after the lawsuit was brought to court and it was last saved before it 
was printed which normally could not happen. Forensic experts discussed that there had 
been a tool used for editing timestamps of the evidence document. Judge concluded that the 
document was fraudulent and Venable’s client won the case, receiving 20 million dollars, 
including sanctions.  
The Doggie Dossier and the Venable cases are just a few of the real-world examples for 
demonstrating that document metadata can contain very sensitive information. Also, em-
bedded spreadsheet shown in Figure 2. proves the fact that metadata can cause problems to 
people and to corporations. The following chapters give an overview of the most common 
document formats and their metadata properties.  
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2.2.1 Metadata in MS office documents 
Microsoft Office is the most popular office product in use for corporations and organizations 
[13]. Applications such as Word, Excel, and PowerPoint, are common applications that gen-
erate MS Office documents, spreadsheets, and presentations. In time Microsoft has changed 
its file formats which affect document structure and characteristics.  
Microsoft Office is supporting two types of file formatting for its document creation appli-
cations. Microsoft Office versions 1995-2003 used binary format called Object Linking and 
Embedding (OLE) protocol [14]. In this format, all information is written in streams that are 
stored in binary file as a linked list of file blocks. With Microsoft Office 2007, MS started 
to support Office Open XML format (OOXML) [15].     
OOXML file format consists of compressed ZIP files called packages. All the contents of 
the document data, XML-s and other parts, are inside the package [16]. OOXML is an open 
structure organized in zip archive. Relationship information is used by applications to locate 
data parts within a package and it is stored inside the package container also.  
Microsoft Office supports different file extensions. Microsoft’s older versions (until 2003) 
support .doc extension for its documents, .xls extension for its spreadsheets, and .ppt exten-
sion for its presentation documents. Supported file extensions for Microsoft Office 2003 are 
shown in Table 1[17].  
Table 1: Microsoft binary format supported extensions [17] 
Word binary format Extension 
Document .doc 
Macro-enabled document .dot 
Microsoft Word Backup Document .wbk 
Exel binary format Extension 
Workbook, spreadsheet .xls 
Template .xlt 
Macro-enabled template .xlm 
PowerPoint binary format Extension 
Presetation .ppt 
Template .pot 
Macro-enabled template .pps 
In following of this thesis paper Microsoft Office OLE format documents are considered as 
MS binary format documents and the documents with extensions .doc, .xls, .ppt are consid-
ered as MS binary formatted documents. Other file extensions shown in Table 1 are not in 
scope of this thesis paper.   
Newer formats of Microsoft Office support OOXML file format, which is basically a con-
tainer file, using industry-standard ZIP format. File extensions of OOXML files are pre-
sented in Table 2 [15].  
Tabel 2: OOXML file types and extensions [15] 
Word XML file type Extension 
Document .docx 
Macro-enabled document .docm 
Template .dotx 
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Macro-enabled template .dotm 
Exel XML file type Extension 
Workbook .xlsx 
Macro-enabled workbook .xlsm 
Template .xltx 
Macro-enabled template .xltm 
Non-XML binary workbook .xlsb 
Macro-enabled add-in .xlam 
PowerPoint XML file type Extension 
Presentation .pptx 
Macro-enabled presentation .pptm 
Template .potx 
Macro-enabled template .potm 
Macro-enabled add-in .ppam 
Show .ppsx 
Macro-enabled show .ppsm 
Slide .sldx 
Macro-enabled slide .sldm 
Office theme .thmx 
In the following of this thesis paper file extensions .docx, .xlsx and .pptx are processed; other 
file extensions are ignored. It is due to the existence of other file extensions being slight on 
the Web, and them not being very popular document types that are hosted on companies’ 
websites. OOXML format documents in this thesis are considered as documents with ex-
tensions .docx, .xlsx and .pptx.  
Microsoft Office documents have functionalities to store extra information about them-
selves, describing the document author, timestamps of when the document was created and 
edited; also when printed and what application the document was processed with. The eas-
iest way to examine that kind of information is using the application the document was 
created with, an example is shown in Figure 1. Observing the document metadata of Mi-
crosoft Office versions 1995-2003 (MS binary format) is more complicated than with newer 
version of Microsoft Office documents.  
For the MS binary files all the data is written in streams that are stored in the binary file as 
linked lists of file blocks [2].  Metadata is stored, for the most part, in Summary Information 
and Document Summary information stream within the file, which means the metadata of 
MS binary documents are not easily viewed. The main options to see metadata of those 
types of documents are with hexadecimal viewers or with the application used to create the 
document. A very good tool for observing metadata is ExifTool by Phil Harvey [18] which 
is platform independent tool working on Perl library. ExifTool supports different file for-
mats, including MS OOXML, PDF, and MS Binary formats. Observing metadata of ran-
domly downloaded document on TTÜ website with the extension of .doc 
(TERVIKTEKST_Doktoritoode_avaldamise_kord_2012.doc), ExifTool prints out the fol-
lowing output:  
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Figure 4: Output of ExifTool 
Analyzing the same document with Microsoft Word application interface, it does not present 
all the metadata information, such as application information of document creator, which 
ExifTool is able to show in its output. ExifTool is used widely by forensic investigators and 
it is also used in a popular malware checking website Virustotal. There are many other tools 
which can be used to investigate metadata of MS binary documents, such as “hachoir-
metadata”, “libextractor”, and “bintext”. To make metadata analysis more effective, third-
party tools are reasonable to use when extracting metadata from MS binary formats. MS 
OOXML format is therefore open by its structure and gives many opportunities to observe 
metadata.  
OOXML documents contain two XML files inside their container that contain metadata. 
Those two XML files are known as app.xml and core.xml, located in docProps directory. 
OOXML Word document structure and location of docProps directory is presented in Fig-
ure 5. Insights to app.xml and core.xml are presented in Appendix 2. App.xml contains prop-
erties about application which created the document as well as information about keywords, 
revisions, editing time, etc. Core.xml contains properties about the document itself, such as 
timestamps, author who created and modified it.   
 
Figure 5: OOXML zip container content 
Core structures of OOXML file inside a container vary and it is depending on the document 
type. Figure 6. shows OOXML container’s default structure. Most complicated structure is 
for presentation files that are generated with PowerPoint application.  
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Figure 6: The structures of different types of OOXML files 
OOXML documents have features that support business processes and data integration with 
documents [19]. The feature is called Custom XML and it is very powerful, enabling in-
teroperability with other systems. It has no content restrictions, only syntactical restrictions, 
meaning it has to be in a well-formed XML format. That means that if the metadata or the 
Custom XML information is not removed from the document, it could contain compromis-
ing information about the organization services which procces that document. As well as a 
Custom XML feature, OOXML documents support embeddings. In Figure 2 there is one 
good example of the embedding’s feature. In embeddings one can find pictures, videos, 
other OOXML files, and binary files. Embeddings are usually the result of document au-
thor’s actions; the problem is, however, that usually the document author is unaware of the 
existence of embedding in that form.   
There are several metadata fields that can be extracted from MS documents. The fields vary 
depending on the MS document format. The core of the metadata fields is the same in both 
file formats (OOXML, OLE): 
● Creator – The creator or author of the document;  
● Created Date – The date when document was created; 
● Modified Date – The date when document was modified and saved;  
● Application – Application name that created the document; 
● App Version – Version of application that created the document;  
● Last Modified By – name of the user who modified the document last; 
● Company – organization or company which created the document; 
● Printer – information about printers which were used for printing the document. 
 
Some of the metadata information is not viewable by Office application interfaces, which 
means the users are likely not aware about full information that their document contains. 
This information as mentioned in previous chapters is considered as hidden information. 
Hidden information can be comments, revision history, and track changes. By copy-pasting 
charts or graphs to .pptx presentation from worksheet, the entire worksheet could be added 
into the OOXML container, but for the user it is presented only as the graph or chart. Anal-
ogous situation is shown in Figure 2. The user might not see the links between the graph 
and the worksheet and, when sharing the document with other parties, accidently causes 
data leak. Example of embeddings existent in OOXML document structure is shown in Fig-
ure 7. A random presentation document (.pptx) was downloaded from the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Research webpage. Red rectangles present content of embeddings. One can see 
that two external Excel Worksheets and four binary object files are in the embeddings .  
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Figure 7: Example of the existence of embeddings in OOXML document structure 
In addition to embeddings and Custom XML features, OOXML and MS binary documents 
contain printer information about the printer that was used for printing the document. Figure 
8. Demonstrates one way how to extract printer information from inside the OOXML file. 
Printer information is stored in a binary file and it contains the name of the printer and driver 
information. The binary file can be viewed with hexadecimal viewers. In Figure 8, extracted 
printer name is “HP LaserJet 1200 Series PLC5”. 
 
Figure 8: Example of OOXML printer extraction 
Metadata is stored in documents for good. It aids in the collaboration and production proc-
cesses of documents among many people. Added comments and track changes features help 
to produce quality documents. Automatically added date fields help to find and open re-
cently proccessed documents (browsing recent files from Word application) from the quick 
access of Office applications. The problem with document metadata is that many users are 
not well-versed in what information is saved with their documents as they share and distrib-
ute them.   
2.2.2 Metadata in PDF documents 
In RFC3778 that describes Portable document format (PDF) has sentenced: “PDF was orig-
inally designed as a way to communicate and view printed information electronically across 
wide variety of computers, devices, and operating systems” [20]. Nowadays it is a popular 
file format to distribute electronic documents. The extension of PDF document is .pdf.  
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PDF’s main goal is to allow users to exchange and view unmodifiable documents. PDF 
preserves the formatting from the file it was created from, which also makes PDF an excel-
lent file format for sharing and printing. No matter which program, software, device, or 
operating system is used for opening a PDF file, it always looks the same [20]. Those are 
some of the reasons why PDF’s existence has such a high percentage on the Web.  
For document sharing on the web, PDF format is also preferred because of its strict structure 
and metadata properties. In the PDF generating process, PDF creators normally strip all the 
hidden information that the original file contained. However, sometimes it is not the case. 
Metadata within PDF documents can be stored in two ways [21]: In a document information 
dictionary or in a metadata stream. Contents of the metadata originating from the document 
information dictionary, are described below (containing author information, timestamps, 
etc.). Metadata stream is represented in XML and it is visible in plain text only if the tools 
are PDF aware. The specific format of XML is defined as Extensible Markup Platform 
(XMP) [21]. The purpose of this format is to allow different programs to process PDF files 
and add their own types of metadata information.   
Metadata information about the documents can be examined in a way similar to Microsoft 
documents, using user interface. In Figure 3 there is shown how metadata looks in the user 
interface when observing a PDF document with the PDF reader application. To see all the 
information about a PDF document, tools can be utilized. There are two commonly used 
tools available: ExifTool which was introduced in chapter 2.2.1, and command line tool 
pdfinfo. ExifTools’ output is shown in Figure 4. Tool pdfinfo returns similar information as 
ExifTool but sometimes some of the metadata fields are not extracted by pdfinfo utility. 
Output of pdfinfo can be seen in Figure 9. Examined PDF document was downloaded from 
UT website at random. According to metadata, document is quite old (from 2006) and doc-
ument author is “Marandi”.  
 
Figure 9: Output of pdfinfo metadata viewer 
PDF metadata is added when document is created, modified, or saved. A PDF file can con-
tain metadata such as title, author, producer, and creation and modification timestamps. As 
shown in output of pdfinfo, several metadata fields exist inside pdf documents. The core 
metadata fields used in this thesis are [21]:   
● Author – contains the name of the person who created the document; 
● Creator – contains the name of the application that was originally used for creat-
ing/converting document to PDF format;  
● Producer – contains the name of the application that was used to convert the docu-
ment to PDF from another format, if conversion took place;  
● CreationDate – Contains the date and time when the document was created; 
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● ModDate – contains the date and time the document was modified.  
PDF documents have less capabilities of storing metadata comparing to MS Office docu-
ments. However, information that can be stored in metadata fields are still compromising 
and in certain circumstances can cause problems. The following chapter discusses the risks 
of metadata.   
2.3 Risks 
Hidden information in electronic documents can pose serious risks and often people are not 
aware of that kind of danger. The intention of metadata is to help with document creation, 
editing, and collaboration: for making it faster and more reliable. But when metadata is 
ignored, third-party people may get unauthorized access to privileged information that could 
be used against you or your organization.  
The problem is not the existence of metadata in documents, but that it is difficult to fully 
identify and remove it. Metadata that is left in documents can easily be viewed by anyone 
with access to these documents. Due to majority of people not being fully aware of the 
metadata existence, they can unwittingly send confidential information outside of their or-
ganization or publish it on the Internet where everyone has access to it. Sharing documents 
that contains sensitive metadata with co-workers in an internal network seems not a very 
harmful action, but if one of the co-workers should send that document to a partner company 
via e-mail, it may be a different story, resulting possible compromise of all the person names 
and comments of those who were working with that document.  
In addition, people and organizations usually do not know when, and for what their docu-
ment metadata is used, and who uses it. It is impossible to control that flow when documents 
are outside of the corporate perimeter. Throughout history there are many cases where doc-
ument metadata has played a significant role, like in court cases, but there is no information 
available on whether the document metadata has been used in preparation of a cyber-attack 
or for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) purposes. In that sense, when talking about 
metadata risks, the facts that metadata provides useful information to attackers about target 
organization users, software, and internal services, should be taken into account. Decreasing 
feasible attack noise, preparing attacks and selecting targets more accurately.     
Metadata inside documents comes in many forms and has different values depending on the 
document format and structure. Understanding the risks and the impact that metadata ex-
poses, each of metadata fields and information they contain has to be discussed separately.  
Below there is a list of metadata types that are found in documents (in MS Office and PDF 
documents) and the risks each type poses in a cyber threat’s perspective. Metadata types are 
chosen considering common metadata properties as well as other fields and information 
which can be found inside documents.  
Document creator/author information 
Applies to: Microsoft Office and PDF documents. 
The risk: Names of document authors who saved or created the document are stored inside 
metadata. Saving that kind of information within document poses several risks including 
sensitive personal information and usernames exposure. Organizations often use first name 
and surname combination as usernames or as local system credentials. Exposing those 
names through metadata can raise many threat vectors for the company and it might help 
conduct brute-force attacks against the organization’s services that are available on the In-
ternet (for example webmail, cloud services).  
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In some organizations, workers names and occupations are hidden and are not publically 
available on the contact list of the website. Through document author metadata fields those 
names can possibly leak. In addition, this author information can reveal possible e-mail tar-
get lists for sending spare phishing e-mails. 
Comparing document creator information with other metadata fields, such as timestamps, 
company name fields, and software version, gives the attacker knowledge about the software 
that was used and the time when it was used. If the document modification date says that 
document was modified yesterday by that person, then one can be quite sure that the victim 
has that version of software running in its systems.  
Document author information exposes and opens plenty of attack vectors which can be used 
against people and organizations.  
File dates and timestamps  
Applies to: Microsoft Office and PDF documents. 
The risk: When a document is created, modified timestamps about that event are saved into 
the document’s metadata. Releasing this information with the document raises little or no 
direct security concerns, but it gives descriptive information of document and its contents 
in that time moment. For example, if a document contains server location or compromising 
information about the organization, it is possible to determine the time period when this 
information is accurate. Also if a document was uploaded to a corporate webpage and 
metadata exposes timestamps and author of the document, then most probably this docu-
ment author works in that company.   
Local and network paths 
Applies to Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) documents. 
The risk: Microsoft Office documents have abilities to store local or network paths within 
them, exposing several risks, including local services and personal information exposure. 
Personal information is typically found in the file path text. The local and network paths of 
documents are usually added to the documents where they are modified. If a document is 
edited in a network share and saved, the file path information can disclose path to that net-
work share. When a document is edited on a local computer then paths refer to a local com-
puter and can disclose username and the operating system.   
Network path’s information could disclose sensitive information about the internal network, 
also about document directories or folders. It means that from the network path one can 
learn how folder naming structure is done- in other words, the directory hierarchy. This 
information provides a view into corporate network topology which leaves the organiza-
tion’s network open to risk of intrusion.  
If a path directory or folder name contains sensitive information, the risk of sensitive infor-
mation leakage can occur outside of the organization; for example, exposing the names of 
projects, departments that are doing them, and clients. When a document was edited on a 
network share, the path to that document can expose potential file server name. For example, 
an attacker could prepare ransomware to target that server in that organization and this ran-
somware does not have to scan local networks, because the location of the server is already 
exposed.  
When documents are edited and modified using web applications or document managing 
platforms, the file path in the metadata can disclose information about the organization’s 
services. Also, if it happens to be an internal service then this information exposes internal 
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DNS namespace. Internal domain name helps the attacker to conduct more accurate phish-
ing attacks, for example, fake login page with prefilled form (backlash internal DNS name 
and username).  
In addition to network paths, the local path also exposes several risks. Local paths where 
the document was edited contains full path to that document or to the template. This means 
it exposes the operating system, logged in user information, as well as hard drive mappings 
or software names. For example, if a document is edited in Outlook and then shared with 
other parties, local path information can contain full path to the Outlook cache directory, 
exposing the organization’s use of Outlook as the e-mail application.  
The following list presents some examples of path information that Microsoft Office docu-
ments contain. Paths are extracted from documents downloaded from microsoft.com web-
site.  
 C:\Users\Luann\Documents\Social\Batch 4\ 
 https://microsoft-my.sharepoint.com/personal/johale_microsoft_com/Docu-
ments/New Use Case Templates/_ALL formatted for upload/ 
 C:\Users\IBM_ADMIN\Desktop\Deliverables\DEMO\2015\WA\Inventory & Market-
Place\Data Def & cue docs\Deb & Suman\WIP_2\DONE_ 28Aug\ 
 U:\Misc\ 
Printer information 
Applies to: Microsoft Office documents. Printer setup information is often stored within a 
Microsoft Office document.  
The risk: Organizations and companies’ IT managers usually name printers in a way that 
they are easily distinguishable from others printers and also by physical locations. Docu-
ments that include printer setup information carry a risk of disclosing sensitive printer path 
information which can contain printer’s physical location and model information. Since 
printer names are described usually in a way that they contain physical location information, 
for example, “HP MFP printer_second_floor_room23”, then this information can be used 
for exposing the document creator’s physical locations. This carries out risks associated with 
personnel location exposure. 
In addition, printer names could contain print server location or file paths that disclose sen-
sitive file path information and provides information about network topology. Attackers can 
read internal network information without penetrating the systems. Matching printer infor-
mation with document creator’s information, it exposes that document author has permis-
sions and access to that resource. From attackers’ perspective, a print server is a valuable 
target, since many documents from different resources are printed through those servers, 
which in turns means that a lot of sensitive data might go through them.  
Printer setup information can include printer’s model name, which represents few concerns; 
however, this information can be used by attackers sending phishing e-mails with attach-
ments or links refering to infected printer drivers.   
The following lines show an example of printer information which can be inside the docu-
ment. Printer names are extracted from documents downloaded randomly from mi-
crosoft.com website: 
 \\red-prn-xrx\b110-3270-a  
 \\PRN-CORP4.redmond.corp.micro 
 \\rfrandsen\HP LaserJet 400 M4    
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One can read out that one of the printer is located in Redmond and probably document 
author works there or visited that place in some point.    
Application and software information 
Applies to: Microsoft Office and PDF documents  
The risk: Microsoft and PDF documents store inside themselves information about applica-
tions that were used to create them. Software information exposes several risks that can be 
used for cyber attacks. Firstly, if an attacker knows the softwares that is used, it can help 
conduct more targeted approach to the victim. If metadata exposes the software’s name, 
version, and timestamps, the attacker can construct malware according to that information, 
reducing exploit choice and increasing success rate.   
Secondly, application names and versions could expose information about the environment 
where people are working. For example, if metadata says that the document is created with 
MS applications, most probably the target operating system is Windows. Thirdly, correlat-
ing software versions with time, it is possible to determine the update cycle of the organiza-
tion and find out if outdated software is used.   
Below there are some examples of software versions that exist in documents, those in par-
ticular are extracted from documents hosted on microsoft.com webpage.  
 Acrobat Distiller 5.0.5 (Windows) 
 FrameMaker 6.0 
 pdfTex-1.40.13 
 Microsoft® Word 2010 
 PDF-XChange 4.0.193.0 (Windows Seven Ultimate x64 (Build 7600)) 
Embedded Objects 
Applies to: Microsoft Office documents. 
The risk: Microsoft Office allows embeddings, meaning that objects are allowed to be cre-
ated inside a document. A case of a simple use of embeddings would be when a user is 
editing a Word document and copies a chart from an Excel document to the Word document. 
Word will show the user the chart that was copied but underneath the visible Word docu-
ment contains the Excel worksheet where all the data is stored in a format that can be read 
by anyone. This feature poses several risks. Firstly, embedded files contain their own 
metadata which can be extracted. Secondly, the embedded Excel table might contain sensi-
tive information and is meant for corporate use only. Also, that table might be originating 
from secret networks, which exposes a high risk for the organization.  
Thirdly, the risk of reusing embedded objects or OOXML documents can occur. That means 
the attacker could send a prepared attachment to the document creator or any other targeted 
personnel and have the same table (which is for corporate internal use only) attached, 
thereby infecting the user computer with malware and for target user perspective it seems 
very truthful. Example of embedded objects is shown in Figure 7.    
Custom information 
Applies to: Microsoft Office documents 
The risk: Custom properties are often used by applications to associate metadata with a 
document. For example, document management systems could use custom properties to as-
sist document categorization or some additional information. Depending on the implemen-
tation, information that can be in custom properties could range from innocuous to highly 
sensitive. Also, custom information could contain descriptive information about internal 
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services. The following example presents some of the information that existed in custom 
metadata fields: 
 <Client_x0020_E-mail david.appel@microsoft.com </Client_x0020_E-mail> 
 <Account_x0020_Contact_x0020_Mobile_x0020_Phone 425-233-2120 </Ac-
count_x0020_Contact_x0020_Mobile_x0020_Phone 
 <Account_x0020_Contact Erin Arnold </Account_x0020_Contact> 
Documents were downloaded from Microsoft.com website; the custom information exposes 
phone numbers, contact names, and e-mail addresses.  
Document Properties  
Applies to: Microsoft Office documents, including PDF documents.  
The risk: Document properties are details about the document that help identify it. Docu-
ment properties contain usually several fields, such as title, subject, author, manager, com-
pany, keywords, and comments. For this thesis paper we exclude author and manager infor-
mation from Document Properties, since the risks those fields can expose are discussed al-
ready in previous points.  
Document properties generally presents few risks. This is because they are a mirror of some 
visible content from the document. However, some of the metadata fields that the document 
properties contain might expose some risks. Field named “Company” helps to bind the doc-
ument with a certain organization, meaning if the document is found somewhere in the Web, 
company field could possibly indicate where that document is originating from. In some 
cases, company name field exposes internal domain namespace.   
Comments information exposes personal information exposure if the comments are not re-
moved. Comments are usually meant for collaboration and, if released, can leak information 
that was not intendent to be there. For example, descriptions of some internal services or 
references. The severity of this threat depends highly on the content of comments.  
For example, some of the document property fields, extracted from documents that were 
downloaded from microsoft.com webpage: 
 <Company>Microsoft</Company> 
 <Company>Infosys Technologies Limited</Company> 
2.4 Related work 
Jeffery R. Jones introduced in his research paper documents’ metadata and the security is-
sues metadata can cause [2]. The paper gives an overview of metadata and its fields in dif-
ferent types of documents, such as Microsoft Office, OpenOffice, and PDF documents.  Pa-
per also introduces tools and places where forensic investigators can find information for 
investigation. Jeffery R. Jones concluded that examination of documents metadata can lead 
to discovery of the following information: documents’ author names; names of contributors 
as well as their recommended changes and comments; network storage path locations, user 
IDs of the document author; as well as computer specific information, such as the GUID 
[2].    
Larry Pesce from the SANS institute published a whitepaper which introduced metadata 
extraction and information gathering approaches [22]. The paper discussed that information 
gathering can be done by documents metadata analysis. Those electronic documents can be 
found from among documents on public websites, from e-mail, or using Google Search. The 
author described how to utilize Google search engine for finding documents on targeted 
websites and how to use Google search engine operators for exposing sensitive information. 
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He concluded that document metadata has a valuable place in information gathering and 
auditing programs, and most organizations do not realize that they have some form of ex-
posure.    
In 2009 Chema Alonso and Enrique Rando described in their whitepaper the tools and tech-
niques how to fingerprint an organization [23]. The structure of that whitepaper is similar 
to Larry Pesce’s paper [22], but some additional techniques are described as well. In general, 
the whitepaper gives a very good overview how to extract metadata from Office and 
OpenOffice documents and what tools and techniques to use for information gathering. In 
addition, the authors introduced a tool called FOCA which stands for “Fingerprinting Or-
ganization with Collected Archives”. It is an automated tool for downloading documents 
published on websites, extracting metadata, and analyzing data.  
A detailed overview of risks of metadata and hidden information is described in Oracle’s 
whitepaper, which was published in 2007 [5]. Oracle performed a study to educate users 
and organizations about the risks associated with information that is commonly exposed 
when documents are shared. The methodology of this study was downloading documents 
from randomly selected websites and analyzing metadata of those documents. This was fol-
lowed by pinpointing the issues found in the documents using a study format containing five 
categories: Target Element Name, Description, Risk, Study Findings, and Recommenda-
tion. Oracle suggested some implementation opportunities to clean documents from 
metadata.  
Hanno Langweg from Norwegian Information Security Laboratory published a paper where 
he examined Microsoft Office document metadata [24]. He conducted the “July 22nd Ter-
rorist Manual” analysis to determine if style changes can be spotted in text which would 
indicate different authorship. The author checked revision numbers, changes in formatting, 
keyboard layout changes, language of metadata paragraphs, and generated of table of con-
tents. The methods described in the paper introduced a new angle how to analyze metadata 
in Office documents, even when there are no document properties available.   
Muhammad Ali Raffay described in his thesis how to hide and detect data in Microsoft 
Office files [25]. In other words, stenography using MS OOXML files was introduced. The 
paper gives a very detailed overview of OOXML structure and its capabilities. Due to the 
structure of OOXML files, extra information can be added inside the document structure 
and it is not detected by the application that opens it. If extra data is inserted, for example, 
inside an xml file that is part of the OOXML file, the end user cannot notice the presence of 
extra information. At the end of this thesis paper an algorithm which detects stenography 
inside OOXML documents was introduced.       
Simson L. Garfinkel introduced in his paper how to recover hidden information from Office 
files [26]. Complex document formats such as Microsoft formats and PDF can contain in-
formation that is hidden but recoverable. This can be the result of embedding files, cropping 
pictures, highlighting text, or adding media files into documents. The paper included exam-
ples of privacy leakages in history that were caused by metadata. Microsoft Office has a tool 
called “Inspector” which finds and removes all sensitive metadata. However, according to 
this paper it is not enough for removing all the sensitive information. According to Simson 
L. Garfinkel, one solution to mitigate metadata privacy issues and exposures is to modify 
tools so that underlying data model is in line with what is presented in the user interface – 
in that way it is harder for the end users to produce documents which contain hidden infor-
mation.    
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Randal Farrar stated in his paper that every Microsoft Office document contains some kind 
of metadata [9]. Every time a document is opened, edited, and saved, metadata is added by 
the operating system, the application itself, and through the use of certain automation fea-
tures. If metadata removal procedures are not in place in organizations, it is a very high 
probability to gain sensitive or harmful information from documents processed by those 
organizations or people. To solve metadata issues, a Metadata policy has to be implemented 
in organizations that involves several topics, including educating people about metadata.  
A very large study was conducted by a group of people [3] where they analyzed over 15 
million distinct documents downloaded from the Internet. The motivation for the research 
was to identify social cliques of users that collaborate in the production of documents by 
correlating the document author field found in document metadata. In addition, the extracted 
amount of metadata showed that the existence of metadata in documents is relatively fre-
quent. The study highlighted several privacy risks involved in sharing documents that carry 
sensitive metadata information.     
The current chapter gave an overview of metadata terminology and presented where 
metadata in documents can be found and which tools to use. In addition, the risks that 
metadata exposure could bring were discussed and overview of related works in this field 
was described. The following chapter describes methods on how to fingerprint an organiza-
tion using the documents hosted on target organization’s webpage.  
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3 Methodology for conducting metadata analysis of publically 
available documents 
Chapter 3 discusses the contribution made in this thesis by introducing fingerprinting 
method in subsection 3.1 for gathering documents from public websites and conducting 
metadata analysis.  
Document collection and metadata analysis aims to validate or disproof the hypothesis set 
in this thesis about whether documents contain compromising metadata for conducting at-
tacks against governmental entities and whether there is a possibility to understand the or-
ganization’s internal processes and services.  
The explained method was used against certain organizations’ websites to validate the hy-
pothesis. The results and analysis will be presented in Chapter 4.  
3.1 Fingerprinting method 
Fingerprinting method consist of three logical stages: document collecting, metadata extrac-
tion, and metadata analysis. Workflow of those stages is presented in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10: Fingerprinting method workflow 
The first stage, document gathering aims to collect electronic documents from selected web-
sites. Document gathering is done by using search engines’ functionalities such as search 
operators. Utilizing search engines functionalities we are able to determine if the data set is 
available and exists for downloading. Search engines’ queries can be specified for finding 
documents with certain file extensions. The returned query results from the search engines 
are downloaded with a web browser plugin such as Download Manager. We did not use in 
this thesis any of automated tools that automatically scrap the documents from the websites, 
nor custom scripts. It is mainly because of the issues with websites’ integrity and availability 
which may occur when scanning websites. In addition, we do not visit the webpages manu-
ally and search for documents. All the document downloads were done based on search 
engine queries. To increase the document findings from the webpages, multiple search en-
gines were used (Google, Yandex, Bing). The following document extensions were down-
loaded: pdf, doc, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx. Duplicate documents were deleted using diff 
function and MD5 hash function.  
The second stage of the fingerprinting method is metadata extraction. The first prerequisite 
of metadata extraction is the existence of documents that were gathered in stage one. All the 
collected documents are examined using different tools, including manual examination. 
Each document format is analyzed separately:  
 PDF documents are analyzed with ExifTool;  
 MS Binary documents (.doc, .xls, .ppt) are analyzed with ExifTool and FOCA;  
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 OOXML documents (.docx, xlsx, pptx) are analyzed with ExifTool, FOCA and with 
manual examination.  
Metadata grabbing with ExifTool is automated with bash scripts. Due to the structure of 
OOXML documents, novel techniques are used for extracting sensitive information, utiliz-
ing manual examination. Metadata fields which ExifTool is capable of extracting (author 
information, timestamps, versions, etc.) are stored into local elasticsearch database for fur-
ther processing. Some of the metadata properties in documents are ignored (for example, 
keywords, number of words, titles). The aim of extraction is to gather all that information 
that can cause dataleaks about the organization and its assets.  
The third stage of fingerprinting method is metadata analysis. Extracted metadata in previ-
ous stage is analyzed manually and the aim is to identify the targeted organization’s assets 
which aid in conducting cyber attacks and exposing internal information.  
In the following subsections all the three stages are described more deeply.  
3.2 Stage 1 - Document collecting 
It is necessary to gather large collections of documents in order to carry out the metadata 
analysis [3]. Metadata analysis can be done when the documents are stored into local sys-
tems (workstations, servers). The more documents we have, the more opportunities to gain 
sensitive information from metadata. In a classic penetration framework this document col-
lecting stage is called reconnaissance phase [27]. This phase is usually the first step for 
attackers, including penetration testers, to gather information about the target and its sys-
tems. It is a starting point to attackers, giving them ideas and knowledge about who their 
victims are. In our case, the starting point are the electronic documents which are uploaded 
to the target organization’s website.  
In general, we assume that there is no direct access to the websites’ files directory nor ad-
ministrative privileges on the victim’s webserver. That means files which are hosted on 
corporate websites have to be gathered some other way. We try to utilize an approach where 
documents are collected remotely without any extra permissions from the website, in the 
same conditions as a potential attacker or penetration tester would have. Since visiting the 
website and scrolling through all subpages is a time consuming approach, we considered to 
use the help of search engines.  
Document gathering is done by using search engines and their functionalities of finding 
documents. For increasing document findings we use three different search engines. Figure 
11. presents the overview of the document collecting structure.  
 
Figure 11: Document gathering done using three different search engines separately 
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Nodes shown in Figure 11 present search engines that were used in this study. We decided 
to use three different search engines and the decision was made upon statistical examination 
of randomly generated query results. Those three search engines shown in Figure 11 re-
turned most responses in our examination. Documents are queried using each search engine 
separately and the results of the query responses are downloaded into local systems where 
the duplicates are removed after wards. Below, overview of the search engines and con-
ducted queries is presented.  
Search engines 
When a document is uploaded in an official corporate website, it becomes available for 
people as well as software systems – search engines. There are many search engines avail-
able, such as Google, Yahoo, Yandex, Bing, Exlead, etc. [28]. Each of them has their own 
specialty but by design they are software systems which help search information from the 
Web. Search engines crawl through the Web using web spiders and index wide range of 
parameters, for instance keywords and backlinks.  
When searching the Web with Google search engine, it returns in most cases thousands or 
even millions of responses if the desired object is indexed. Those results can be optimized 
by using search operators the search engines provide. Google has several search operators 
which are useful for conducting information gathering. For example, if one wants to find 
files from University of Tartu (UT) website with extension “pptx”, Google search operators 
“site” and “filetype” can be utilized. Results of this conducted query is shown in Figure 12. 
This method is called in other words “Google Hacking”[26]. This is a powerful functionality 
for searching documents with certain file extensions. Manually scrolling through UT 
webpage and its subpages, searching for a “pptx” files would take a lot of time, but with a 
search engine it took only 0.12 seconds (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Google search operators 
Google search operator “site” finds results associated with the domain name which is passed 
in for the query, including also the subdomains. Figure 12 presents that Google found pptx 
files from the UT subdomains. If a targeted website has aliases then it is necessary to query 
documents from all of its top level domains for maximizing document findings. Download-
ing process for the search engine queries is quite simple, it is only needed to click on the 
link the search engine finds. However, downloading manually by clicking links the search 
engines respond with is a quite time consuming activity. For optimizing download process, 
web browser plugins, such as Download Managers, are used. Download Managers down-
load all the results that are found by the search engine.    
Since each search engine is different by design and by web indexing capabilities, three sep-
arate search engines are used for information gathering.  For example, searching PDF doc-
uments from TTU webpage, Yandex returns 64000 results but Google only 30700, which is 
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less than half of what Yandex has found. Figure 13 presents mentioned example; response 
amounts are shown in red rectangles.  
Figure 13: Yandex vs Google 
Each search engine was used separately for querying the Web with specific search operators. 
Search operators and queries that were used are described below.  
Google: 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:docx 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:doc 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:xlsx 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:xls 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:pptx 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:ppt 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:pdf 
Yandex: 
site:targetsite.ee mime:docx 
site:targetsite.ee mime:doc 
site:targetsite.ee mime:xlsx 
site:targetsite.ee mime:xls 
site:targetsite.ee mime:pptx 
site:targetsite.ee mime:ppt 
site:targetsite.ee mime:pdf 
Bing:  
site:targetsite.ee filetype:docx 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:doc 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:xlsx 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:xls 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:pptx 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:ppt 
site:targetsite.ee filetype:pdf 
The search operator “site:targetsite.ee” is fictive and has to be replaced with the targeted 
organization’s domain name, for example “site:ut.ee” if UT would be our target. All the 
downloaded documents are compared with MD5 hash function and the duplicates are re-
moved.  
Following subchapter presents metadata extraction techniques and approaches, in order to 
extract compromising information out of the documents.  
3.3 Stage 2 - Metadata extraction 
The method of conducting metadata extraction from documents was decided upon exami-
nation of specifications of each document format, as well as manual examination of hun-
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dreds of publically available documents on the Internet. Review of literature and investiga-
tion of different documents gave an understanding that there is no single tool available on 
the Internet that can possibly extract all meaningful metadata and hidden information for 
fingerprinting purposes. That means there is no single solution for extracting metadata, 
therefore, some other approaches are needed in order to carry out this study. In Figure 14, 
an overview of metadata extraction steps is presented. Documents are analyzed on the basis 
of document format, depending on which different tools were utilized.  
 
Figure 14: Metadata extraction  
All of the document formats are analyzed using ExifTool whose output is saved into local 
elasticsearch database. Metadata fields which ExifTool extracts and stores into database, 
differ slightly by each file format. Those extracted metadata fields are introduced in the 
following sections. In addition to ExifTool, FOCA is used for analyzing MS Office docu-
ments. The aim of using FOCA is to extract printer information from MS Office documents. 
FOCA has functionalities to analyze and extract all the document types that were discussed 
before, but the tool misses a lot of information, especially when considering OOXML doc-
uments. In addition, OOXML documents are analyzed utilizing manual examination ap-
proaches. Novel methods on how to conduct OOXML document analysis are introduced in 
Chapter 3.3.3.   
The aim of this stage is to scrap as much compromising information from the documents as 
possible. We want to fingerprint an organization, that means all information related to that 
organization is important. Next subchapters present methods and techniques on how 
metadata extraction is done in this study.  
3.3.1 PDF documents 
The amount of documents each website contains can range from one to thousands. This 
means that looking at documents’ metadata by using the application interface and checking 
the properties there can be very time consuming. For faster metadata extraction third-party 
tool is used.   
There are several useful tools available which help to extract metadata from PDF docu-
ments. We decided to use ExifTool for analyzing PDF documents because of the tool’s ca-
pability to extract more metadata and present it in a readable output. Figure 15 shows 
metadata extraction comparison between ExifTool and pdfinfo (pdfinfo was introduced in 
chapter 2).  The following figure shows comparison between ExifTool and pdfinfo default 
outputs. 
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Figure 15: ExifTool and pdfinfo output comparison 
It can be noticed that ExifTool prints more information to its output, for example, metadata 
fields such as “XMP toolkit” and “Creator Tool”. The difference is that pdfinfo does not 
print on its output default information that is in the metadata stream. This is the reason why 
we prefer ExifTool in this research.  
From ExifTool output, metadata fields which are meaningful for fingerprinting purposes are 
extracted to a local database, other fields are ignored. The following metadata fields are 
extracted:  
● Author 
● Creator 
● Producer 
● Title 
● Created Date 
● Modify Date 
● PDF version 
● XMP Toolkit 
● Creator Tool 
For filter out those metadata fields from ExifTool output, command-line search utility egrep 
is used. Figure 16 shows an example of filtered metadata fields from the output of ExifTool 
which is shown in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 16: Selecting metadata fields using egrep 
For automating the metadata extracting process, bash script is used for scanning thru all the 
downloaded PDF documents and extracting the metadata fields which were discussed pre-
viously. The data is saved into local elasticsearch database for further analysis. 
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3.3.2 MS Office older format (doc, xls, ppt) 
MS Office older versions support binary format where all the data is written in streams and 
it is stored in a binary file. To examine parts or contents of that binary file, some extra tools 
are needed for observation. As mentioned in chapter 2.2.2, several tools are available that 
can be utilized for extracting metadata from MS binary formats.  
In this thesis two third-party applications are chosen for extracting metadata from the MS 
binary formatted documents. First tool is ExifTool already introduced in previous chapters, 
and second tool is FOCA. FOCA is used for extracting printer information from MS binary 
format documents. Figure 17 presents metadata information that is extracted with FOCA 
from a document randomly downloaded from the UT webpage. FOCA managed to extract 
printer information form the .xls document as well as operating system information. 
 
Figure 17: Metadata extraction from spreadsheet using FOCA 
However, FOCA sometimes misses timestamps of when the document was created, modi-
fied, or printed. Timestamp information is important for understanding, for example, what 
time that version of software was used in the company. Also, timestamp information gives 
an overview of the relevance of the extracted information. For information as such, ExifTool 
tool is used. Figure 18 shows ExifTool’s output of the extracted information from the MS 
binary format document. 
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Figure 18: Output of ExifTool 
From ExifTool’s output we gather the metadata fields that are important for fingerprinting 
purposes. Those fields are: 
● Author;  
● Last Modified By; 
● Software;  
● Create Date;  
● Modify Date;  
● Last Printed;  
● Company; 
● App Version;  
● Comp Obj User Type 
Named metadata fields are filtered out and saved into the database. The approach is the 
same with PDF documents where command-line utility egrep is used. Extracting process 
is automated with bash script which searches MS binary files from the downloaded folders 
and extracts metadata when specific documents are found. Figure 19 presents filtered 
metadata fields’s output that is saved into the database.  
 
Figure 19: Exiftool filtered output of .xls file 
Printer information is extracted from MS binary documents using FOCA tool. The results 
of FOCA output is analyzed manually.  
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3.3.3 MS OOXML format (docx, xlsx, pptx) 
Microsoft OOXML format is more accessible compared to older MS binary formats. When 
documents are saved in this format, metadata can be viewed and accessed by viewing the 
source XML files with XML or text editors.  
Most of the forensic tools and metadata extractors read information only from core.xml and 
app.xml which miss a lot of information. Since metadata can be propagated automatically 
into document during its creation/modifying process or by other applications, then custom 
information could exists very often in other parts of OOXML files. For example, a random 
spreadsheet document was downloaded from microsoft.com website containing path infor-
mation that was not located in app.xml or core.xml. Figure 20 shows metadata extraction 
using the tool FOCA which did not detect any file paths inside OOXML file (marked with 
red rectangle). However, the document contained a file path in its workbook.xml file which 
is a part of the OOXML container. The file path was extracted manually by observing con-
tents of the OOXML files; the path is presented in Figure 20 inside the blue rectangle.   
 
Figure 20. Extraction of local file path   
In this thesis, all kinds of information describing file paths or softwares, or any information 
that is useful for fingerprinting purposes, is essential. To maximize meaningful metadata 
extraction, it should be taken into consideration that different approaches are needed for 
getting all the important data from documents. Figure 21 shows the workflow of metadata 
extraction from OOXML files. Extraction process is logically divided into three phases: 
● Common metadata extraction using ExifTool; 
● Searching specific directories, which indicates the existence of custom/compromis-
ing information;  
● Conducting string searches from unpacked OOXML files.  
 
Figure 21: Examination of OOXML file workflow 
Phases which are shown in Figure 21 are described in more detail below.  
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Extracting common metadata 
Common metadata fields are extracted using ExifTool much like with the PDF and MS bi-
nary documents. The following metadata fields are selected from ExifTool output and saved 
into the local database.   
● Creator 
● App Version 
● Last Modified By 
● Last Printed 
● Create Date 
● Modify Date 
● Company 
● Application  
Metadata is gathered from app.xml and core.xml files inside the OOXML container. An 
example of a filtered output OOXML document is shown in Figure 22. The document is 
downloaded from UT website at random and analyzed with the method described above.  
 
Figure 22: Output of ExifTool OOXML metadata 
The extraction process is automated with bash script which scans the download folder for 
OOXML files and when the file is found metadata extraction utilized. Printer information 
is scraped with FOCA and this information is processed manually.  
Querying specific directories 
Second phase of the extraction process is folder searching inside of the OOXML file and 
manual examination. The analysis of several documents resulted in a decision that the only 
appropriate way to understand the contents of data that can be inside OOXML file is utiliz-
ing manual examination. Inside OOXML files there are several folders which potentially 
could contain sensitive information essential for fingerprinting purposes.  
The following list presents the folders that could contain information needing additional 
manual investigation in order to gather sensitive information. The list is illustrated with the 
examples of extracted findings from random documents on the Web for proof of concept 
purposes.  
● \media – contains media files, such as pictures and videos. In some cases media 
folder contains screenshots from the user’s desktop, exposing operating system and 
software names, for example, information from taskbar icons. An example of pptx 
file which contains several files in its media folder, is shown in Figure 23. Examining 
the image, it can be deduced that the document author is probably using Microsoft 
Office 2007.  
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Figure 23: Contents of media folder exposes software version 
● \embeddings – contains embedded or external content. Embeddings can be other 
files, such as OOXML documents or objects which are inserted into the document.  
For example, in Figure 24, embedded spreadsheet files are shown that are embedded 
in the PowerPoint presentation. The presentation file, shown in Figure 23, contains 
6 different embedded files and those files usually preserve their metadata. That in-
creases the possibility of extracting very compromising information about the ob-
served organization.  
 
Figure 24: Content of random document embeddings 
● \customXml – contains custom information which is inserted by the user or other 
applications, for example, document content management systems. Information 
found in that folder is ranged from innocuous to highly sensitive, depending on the 
implementation.      
 
Figure 25: CustomXml appearing in word document  
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● \custom – Contains a custom.xml file which can hold any custom document proper-
ties added by the user or developer, or through custom logic. Very often the cus-
tom.xml is located in docProps directory. Information in the custom.xml file can be 
used for guessing or deriving internal services.  For example, in Figure 26, cus-
tom.xml contains information about e-mail accounts. 
 
  
Figure 26: Custom.xml contains information about e-mails 
● \externallinks – contains information about relationships with other resources.  
Resources can be file absolute paths, external and internal services, or file servers. 
For example, in Figure 27 an absolute path to a local computer is shown, exposing 
the user name and operating system that were used.   
Figure 27: Directory externallinks exposing link to external resource  
 
● printerSettings – contains information about the printer’s name and drivers. Folder 
contents are binary files. For example, printer information extracted from the docu-
ment “Kaitsmiste ajakava (14.06.2016).xls”that was downloaded from cs.ut.ee 
website. 
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Figure 28: Printer information extracted with FOCA 
 \revision – contains XML files which describes revisions and its related infor-
mation. Folder contains timestamps about revisions and about author who made it. 
Figure 29 shows revision related files of presentation file.  
 
 
Figure 29: Revisions exposing name of the revision’s author and timestamp 
Folders that are mentioned above can be found using ExifTool verbose mode or unpacking 
all OOXML files and using search utilities. ExifTool verbose mode (flag –V for activating 
verbose mode) returns in its output an unzipped structure of the OOXML file, presenting 
all its XML and data files in a directory tree. By filtering that output using egrep one can 
find folders discussed above, if they appear.  
Unpacking OOXML files and conduct string searches 
Final phase of metadata extraction from OOXML files are specific string searches from 
unpacked OOXML files. In the analysis of .docx, .pptx, and .xlsx files we notice that 
metadata, such as network and local path information as well as other custom information, 
can be stored inside other parts of OOXML files. For finding that information we were 
considering using text search utility egrep and search for specific strings.  
Before searching strings and XML tags, the documents have to be in an unpacked form. For 
unpacking the documents we used bash script which scans the folder, and if it finds files 
with the extensions .docx, .xlsx, .pptx then the document will be unzipped.  
The following strings are searched:  
● “\” or “\\” – finding backslashes for exposing possible directories, server addresses, 
paths, network shares;  
● “@” exposing possible e-mail accounts associated with the document. Regular ex-
pression can be utilized: "@\w+\.\w+"; 
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● “absPath” – exposing path where the document was modified or created. Usually 
indicates the path were document is modified;   
● “cmAuthor” and <author> – exposing the names of people who have commented 
the document. 
● <Url> <\URL> tags – could contain internal services addresses;  
● “.intra”, “.sise” – could contain internal DNS names; 
● “File:///” - contains file path information; 
● “https” – exposes potential web services that are used in organization;   
● “Descry=” – exposes information about local paths, referring to other sources such 
as pictures or other documents. 
If some of the custom information is found in documents, one can specify the string searches 
upon the string found and utilize regular expressions.   
This phase of the OOXML extraction presents a novel method and string values in order to 
find sensitive information from OOXML container documents.     
3.4 Stage 3 - Metadata analysis 
In the previous subchapter we mentioned that metadata extracted with ExifTool were stored 
into a local elasticsearch database. We use that database for making the metadata analysis 
quicker and more convenient. This raises effectiveness of processing the metadata which 
was gathered. In addition, we use Kibana graphical interface to make collected information 
more readable. 
For the summary of the metadata analysis we want to get answers to the following aspects: 
● Services 
o External – services that are described in metadata and are accessible over the 
Internet; 
o Internal – services that run only in corporate networks; 
● Domain namespace – internal domain namespace; 
● Servers – file servers, print servers, domain controllers;  
● Softwares, application – what software runs in observed organization environments; 
● User roles – finding the website content manager, for example; 
● Operating systems. 
Outcome of this stage of fingerprinting method is to analyze extracted metadata information 
and find sensitive information which can be used for fingerprinting purposes and for con-
ducting possible cyber attacks against observed organization. In addition, to determine pos-
sible links and relationships between people and organizations who collaborate in document 
processing. 
This chapter described a method of fingerprinting an organization by just using the metadata 
of electronic documents hosted on their website. The fingerprinting method consists of three 
separate stages – document collecting, metadata extraction, and metadata analysis. We in-
troduced novel methods and approaches on how all the meaningful information can be ex-
tracted from documents. The next chapter presents the results and analysis of the outcomes 
of the fingerprinting method which was used against three different governmental organi-
zations' webpages.  
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4 Results and analysis 
This chapter presents the results of three Estonian governmental organization’s public doc-
ument metadata analysis. The analysis is conducted by three stages that were discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
The fingerprinting method discussed in Chapter 3 is utilized against Estonian ministries’ 
webpages in order to validate or disproof the proposed hypothesis. Those ministries were 
chosen upon collaboration with the ministries’ chief of information officers. We asked per-
missions to conduct this study and share our results with them. For privacy reasons, those 
ministry names are hidden and ministries are named as follows: Ministry A, Ministry B, and 
Ministry C. The actual results of the extracted information is showed in Appendixes 3-5.  
The first stage of this analysis is document gathering. Documents are downloaded from 
governmental organizations’ webpages and analyzed. All the documents are publically 
available for everyone and there is no access to webservers’ upload or data folders directly. 
No automated tools are used; all the documents are gathered by utilizing search engine fea-
tures. Documents with the following extensions are searched and downloaded: pdf, docx, 
doc, xlsx, xls, pptx, ppt. Other document formats are ignored. The second stage is metadata 
extraction from collected documents. The third and final stage presents the results of stage 
1 and 2 outcomes. The ultimate goal is to gain sensitive information about organizations’ 
IT infrastructure and information about end users devices which aids in building attacks 
against those organizations and fingerprinting them.  
For conducting this analysis two different virtual machines are used: Ubuntu 16.04 and 
Windows 8.1. All the tools that are used are open source and available for everyone.  
The following subsections will present the outcomes of three Estonian governmental organ-
izations’ metadata analysis with statistical data, and the conclusions. 
4.1 Documents gathered 
This section presents the results of collected documents from observed websites. This is the 
first stage of fingerprinting method. Documents were collected from the organizations’ web-
sites that are associated with the organization’s domain and indexed by search engines.  
Results of gathered documents are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Documents collected form observed ministries 
Ministry A Ministry B Ministry C 
PDF:  275 PDF:  345 PDF:  960 
DOCX: 56 DOCX: 4 DOCX: 22 
doc: 71 doc: 20 doc: 189 
xls: 84 xls: 1 xls: 374 
xlsx: 125 xlsx: 0 xlsx: 9 
ppt: 14 ppt: 0 ppt: 73 
pptx:  19 pptx:  0 pptx:  2 
Total: 644 Total: 370 Total: 1633 
The results of document occurrences in organizations’ websites validate the research which 
is presented in Appendix 1 – PDF documents are most popular electronic document format 
available on websites. We can notice that document occurrences depend highly on the be-
haviour of a particular organization. For example, Ministry B is more restricted in sharing 
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documents on their website, especially MS Office documents, but Ministry C has five times 
more documents hosted on their website. A better visual overview is presented in Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30: Gathered documents by document extension 
The majority of MS documents that were found in observed sites were in older MS binary 
format, which can indicate that either those documents are old and uploaded years ago, or 
those document templates are reused and the format is preserved that way.  
The amount of collected documents was expected since governmental entities have to be 
transparent according to laws and have to provide service to citizens which often means 
document sharing on their websites. The data set is reasonable and gives prerequisites for 
the next stages of this analysis. We managed to collect 2643 electronic documents in total.  
4.2 Metadata extracted 
The second stage of the fingerprinting method is metadata extraction. Metadata is extracted 
from gathered documents in previous section. Statistical results are presented in the follow-
ing chapters and the actual extracted metadata information is presented in Appendixes 3-5.   
4.2.1 Ministry A 
The following tables present the results of scraping metadata from public documents from 
Ministry A website. The total amount of documents which were analyzed is 644. The results 
for each file format are presented by its format type. Table 4 presents results of extracted 
metadata fields from PDF documents.  
Table 4: Extracted metadata from Ministry A PDF documents  
Metadata field Rate % Files Affected:  
File Name 100,0 267 
Author 81,3 217 
Creator 99,6 266 
Producer 93,6 250 
Title 30,0 80 
Create Date 100,0 267 
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Modify Date 99,3 265 
PDF version 100,0 267 
XMP Toolkit 22,5 60 
Creator Tool 22,5 60 
We managed to extract 217 author’s names from 267 PDF documents, which could be po-
tential usernames of computer accounts. Most frequently occurred information that we man-
aged to extract were timestamps, information about document author, application which 
processed the document, and PDF version (Metadata fields: Create Date, Modify Date, Cre-
ator, Producer and Author). The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the metadata of 
PDF documents is not properly removed and every document contains some of the metadata 
fields which can be used for fingerprinting. 
In addition to PDF documents, we managed to download 369 Microsoft Office documents 
from Ministry A webpage. MS Office documents were with extensions docx, doc, xls, xlsx, 
ptt, pttx. The following Table.5 shows metadata extraction results of MS documents.  
Table 5: Extracted metadata from Ministry A MS Binary files 
MS Binary format (doc, xls,ppt) MS OOXML format (docx, xlsx, pttx) 
Metadata field Rate % Files Affected:  Metadata field: Rate % Files Affected:  
File Name                        100,0 170 File Name 100,0 199 
Author                           100,0 170 Creator 95,5 190 
Last Modified By                 100,0 170 Last Modified By 95,5 190 
Software                         97,6 166 Last Printed 44,7 89 
Create Date                      100,0 170 Application 100,0 199 
Modify Date                      100,0 170 Create Date 100,0 199 
Company                          91,8 156 Modify Date 100,0 199 
App Version                      100,0 170 Company 78,9 157 
Comp Obj User Type               73,5 125 App Version 100,0 199 
Printer Information 53,5 91 Printer Information 58,8 117 
Paths 1,2 2 Embedding’s 6,5 13 
The majority of the documents contained author information as well as additional names in 
“Last Modified By” and “Last Printed” metadata field (shown in Table 5), which expose 
potential usernames and personnel names. Compared to PDF documents, MS documents 
contain more extra information in metadata fields and the rates of metadata occurrences are 
higher. More than half (56%) of the documents contained printer information and we were 
able to extract the local path information from two of the MS binary formatted documents. 
In addition, many documents contained “Company” information which gives additional 
confidence about where the document is originating from.   
From MS OOXML documents, the existence of embeddings were discovered in 13 docu-
ments (shown in Table 5).  From the 13 documents containing embedded extra content, we 
were able to extract 140 different files: 127 spreadsheet documents (with xlsx and xls ex-
tensions) and 13 binary objects. Surprisingly, the number of found documents inside em-
beddings is high, almost as many as were gathered from the website. Those embedded 
spreadsheets contain their own metadata and could potentially contain sensitive information. 
Embeddings were found from Word and PowerPoint documents. One example of embed-
ding occurrence in a document is presented in Figure 31. The PowerPoint presentation file 
contained 17 embedded spreadsheet documents.  
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Figure 31: PowerPoint presentation containing 17 embedded spreadsheets 
Each worksheet has its own metadata. In addition, those spreadsheets can potentially contain 
sensitive corporate data, which could expose internal workflow, processes, calculations, and 
data. 
The results presented in Table 4 and Table 5 are extracted using ExifTool. As was explained 
in Chapter 3.3.3, we utilized novel manual examination methods for extracting metadata 
from OOXML files. Table 6 presents the results of manual examination.  
Table 6: Results of manual examination of Ministry A OOXML documents: 
Hidden information findings Unique Total 
Local and network paths, directories 41 169 
Additional document authors name 39 85 
URL-s 3 22 
We were able to manually extract additional information from comments, revisions, and 
custom fields. The results of manual extraction are significant; the information we managed 
to gather exposes internal file servers and services.   
According to the results shown in Tables 4-6 we determine that MS Office documents con-
tain more descriptive information about the observed organization’s internal assets. Most of 
the compromising information we managed to extract from OOXML documents and espe-
cially from presentation files.  
The results showed that all the documents contained some metadata and metadata common 
fields were not removed. Actual contents of extracted results are presented in Appendix III. 
4.2.2 Ministry B 
The following tables present the results of scraping metadata from public documents of 
Ministry B website. Total amount of documents which were analyzed are 370.  
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Table 7: Extracted metadata from Ministry B PDF documents 
Metadata field Rate % Files Affected:  
File Name 100,0 345 
Author 80,0 276 
Creator 90,4 312 
Producer 93,3 322 
Title 51,3 177 
Create Date 95,1 328 
Modify Date 90,7 313 
PDF version 99,1 342 
XMP Toolkit 37,7 130 
Creator Tool 34,5 119 
As shown in Table 7, the majority of documents which existed on Ministry B website were 
in PDF format. We were able to detect 12 PDF documents which had properly removed 
metadata and only the metadata field “PDF version” existed in metadata. 
We also managed to gather some of the MS Office documents from the observed website 
and the results of extracted metadata are presented in Table 8.   
Table 8: Extracted metadata from Ministry B MS Office documents 
MS Binary format (doc, xls,ppt) MS OOXML format (docx, xlsx, pttx) 
Metadata field Rate % Files Affected:  Metadata field: Rate % Files Affected:  
File Name                        100,0 23 File Name 100 4 
Author                           91,3 21 Creator 100 4 
Last Modified By                 91,3 21 Last Modified By 100 4 
Last Printed 39,1 9 Last Printed 25 1 
Software                         100,0 23 Application 100 4 
Create Date                      100,0 23 Create Date 100 4 
Modify Date                      100,0 23 Modify Date 100 4 
Company                          26,1 6 Company 100 4 
App Version                      100,0 23 App Version 100 4 
Printer Information 4,3 1 Printer Information 0 0 
Paths 4,3 1 Embedding’s 0 0 
From the MS binary format documents we were able to detect one printer and one local file 
path. From OOXML files we did not detect embeddings or custom information that might 
expose compromising information. An interesting finding was the file path information 
which was inside the PDF metadata field “Title”. This is shown in Figure 32.   
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Figure 32: Metadata found in “Title” field, exposing file local path information 
Comparing results shown in Table 8 with Ministry A’s results it can be concluded that they 
are demure. We were not able to detect many local and network path informations and it is 
mainly due to the occurrences of MS Office documents being few. MS Office documents 
have more capabilities to store path information and embeddings.  
4.2.3 Ministry C 
The following tables present the results of scraping metadata from public documents of 
Ministry C website. Total amount of documents which were analyzed are 1633.  
Table 9: Extracted metadata from Ministry C PDF documents 
Metadata field Rate % Files Affected:  
File Name 100,0 959 
Author 79,9 766 
Creator 87,4 838 
Producer 99,6 955 
Title 79,2 760 
Create Date 99,3 952 
Modify Date 96,1 922 
PDF version 100,0 959 
XMP Toolkit 22,5 216 
Creator Tool 19,3 185 
All the PDF documents that we analyzed contained metadata which could be used for fin-
gerprinting purposes. Since the amount of PDF documents we located on their website is 
large, we were able to extract a lot of metadata. We extracted 838 user information and 955 
document producer application names with version info. Those amounts of metadata give a 
very good overview of the software portfolio used in the organization and of the authors and 
users who are working with the documents. 
 46 
 
We also gathered significant amount of MS Office documents. Most of the documents were 
in older MS binary format.  
Table 10: Extracted metadata from Ministry of C MS Office documents 
MS Binary format (doc, xls,ppt) MS OOXML format (docx, xlsx, pttx) 
Metadata field Rate % Files Affected:  Metadata field: Rate % Files Affected:  
File Name                        100,0 636 File Name 100,0 33 
Author                           46,4 295 Creator 100,0 33 
Last Modified By                 90,6 576 Last Modified By 100,0 33 
Last Printed 40,7 259 Last Printed 36,4 12 
Software                         49,2 313 Application 100,0 33 
Create Date                      99,8 635 Create Date 100,0 33 
Modify Date                      100,0 636 Modify Date 100,0 33 
Company                          43,6 277 Company 90,9 30 
App Version                      100,0 636 App Version 100,0 33 
Printer Information 12,9 82 Printer Information 9,1 3 
Paths 10,4 66 Embedding’s 15,2 5 
We were able to extract a lot of metadata from the MS office documents. Every document 
contained metadata. Most of the sensitive metadata we extracted from the documents orig-
inated from the MS binary and spreadsheet documents.  
We found five OOXML documents containing embeddings. From the embeddings we 
managed to extract 14 different files: 10 files with .docx extension, 1 binary file, 1 file 
with xlsx extension, and 1 file with .doc extension. One OOXML Word document con-
tained 5 different Word files which were embedded into it (shown in Figure 33). Word 
files embedded to Word files is a relatively rare occasion. All embeddings preserved their 
own original metadata and we were able to additionally extract it.  
 
Figure 33: Word files embedded to Word document 
From manual examination of OOXML documents we managed to extract information which 
is showed in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Metadata gathered with manual examination from Ministry C OOXML docu-
ments 
Hidden information findings Unique Total 
Local and network paths, directories 10 25 
Additional document authors name 3 3 
URL-s 0 0 
The number of OOXML documents on Ministry C website were not very large, we man-
aged to extract 25 path information from 33 documents. Almost every OOXML document 
contained information about path where it was modified, which is impressive. We did not 
detect any URL-s from metadata which refers to internal service.  
In this section we processed 2643 electronic documents and extracted metadata from them. 
Only 12 documents had metadata properly removed, even timestamps. Most of compro-
mising information were found in MS OOXML documents. We managed to extract 154 
files and documents from OOXML embedding’s. This is number is significant, those em-
bedded files could possible contain sensitive internal information and we got additional 
metadata information from those embedded documents. Most embedding’s were found in 
presentation files, which to the nature of the document promotes embedding’s existents. 
All the printer information is originating from MS spreadsheet documents. This is same 
for both versions of MS Office. We also detect some of the printer information from 
presentation files and from PDF documents. In PDF documents printer information were 
described in “producer” metadata field.   
PDF documents are one of the most popular document format which is shared in public 
websites. One reason for that is when converting document to PDF format it strips most of 
the metadata. We analyzed 1850 PDF documents which almost all contained its core 
metadata fields. PDF documents gave very good overview about software names and ver-
sions, also about document authors in the observed organization.  
We detected most of custom information from Word documents.(.docx). Word documents 
have included custom fields in its OOXML structure which contained information about 
document management systems parameters as well as URLs of document management 
service. 
According to the metadata extraction results, we can conclude that most dangerous docu-
ments in terms of metadata extraction are OOXML presentation documents. We were able 
to find one document which contained 17 embeddings. Next section presents manual anal-
ysis of extracted metadata. 
4.3 Analysis of extracted metadata 
This section describes analysis of documents metadata which were gathered and extracted 
from previous stages. Outcome of this section is the manual analysis of extracted infor-
mation to determine whether observed organizations leaks information which aids third-
parties to conduct cyber attacks against them. In addition this section validates our hypoth-
esis which is posed for this thesis.  
4.3.1 Analysis of Ministry A 
The final stage of the fingerprinting method is the analysis of the extracted information 
which were gathered in the previous stages. Table 12 presents conclusive results of the Min-
istry A metadata analysis based on manual observation of extracted metadata.  
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Table 12: Analysis results of Ministry A 
Findings Description of findings 
Detected services 
 
 
Internal 
We were able to detect two internal ser-
vices, and according to path descriptions 
from metadata, those services are for docu-
ment management/sharing services. One of 
the services was using HTTP protocol, 
which means if the service has some kind 
of authentication implemented, it is a good 
place to sniff passwords.  
From the local file path information we de-
tected an e-mail client application and we 
can assume which e-mail services the or-
ganization most likely uses.   
External 
We found references to external webserver 
located in Estonia. We cannot determine 
whether it belongs to Ministry A or not, but 
that information can be used for cyber ac-
tivities.      
Doman namespace From the local and network paths and from 
document common metadata we were able 
to detect four different internal domain 
names. 
Servers We discovered nine different servers.  
Three of the detected servers are most prob-
ably Windows fileservers. In addition, one 
of the servers stores the organization’s us-
ers roaming profiles. Another six servers 
are print servers. 
Software, application Most frequently used Office software is Mi-
crosoft Office 2007 and 2013. We deter-
mined that mentioned software is the main 
program for creating PDF documents. 
Overall, names of the software that are used 
for document creation were detected. 
Printer information We were able to detect 6 different print 
servers. In addition, we detected printer 
vendors that are used in that organization, 
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and driver information. Printer information 
indicates that there are different physical lo-
cations for the organization, or personnel 
are printing documents in multiple places. 
Furthermore, from printer information we 
are able to conclude that the organization is 
located in a high building and some of the 
personnel are working on the 14h floor. 
Personnel information, roles  We detected 178 unique user information. 
Majority of that information was extracted 
from document author and creators fields; 
however, some of the information were ex-
tracted from embeddings, local paths, and 
comments. 
We detected two possible persons who 
could be websites content managers. 
Relationships between persons, companies, 
organizations.  
Identified possible relationships of certain 
users between different organizations.  
From metadata some of documents con-
tained other governmental organization 
metadata. In addition links between those 
different organization personnel are de-
tected. 
Operating systems We detected that mainly Windows based 
operating systems is used. In addition some 
of Windows XP workstations and Macin-
tosh operating systems identified. 
Some of the more interesting findings show patterns between people and organization. From 
the “Company” metadata field we detected other organizations’ names in documents that 
were uploaded in Ministry A’s website. This means that those documents are exchanged 
between organizations and the metadata exposes the documents’ actual authors. Therefore, 
we are able to see the patterns between organizations and people who share documents with 
each other, and this opens many potential attack vectors. In addition, some of the documents 
which contained a different name on the “Company” metadata field instead of where they 
were originating from, contained some sensitive metadata of their own. This means that 
documents which were uploaded onto Ministry A website contained other governmental 
organization’s documents metadata filled with some compromising information, such as in-
formation about internal servers and domain names.    
The compromising information about links between documents’ authors come from “last 
modified by”, “last printed”, and “creator” metadata fields. Correlating these fields with 
“company” metadata field, we were able to detect in which company document author is 
most probably working. For example, in Figure 34 possible links between the organizations 
and author of the document are presented. For drawing such a graph, Maltego software is 
used [29]. Maltego software is used widely by penetration testers for gathering information 
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about observed targets and to detect links between several entities. In Figure 34 we searched 
links between “author” and “company” metadata fields. 
 
Figure 34: Visualizing links between document authors and organizations with Maltego 
Those possible links between document authors and organizations are useful information 
for cyber criminals who could send spoofed e-mails based on the exposed links between 
people. In addition, attackers might approach the target organization through a partner or-
ganization’s systems. 
We managed to bind some of the users network share names with the internal server. If a 
user had network mapping “X:\” we were able to detect the server location in the internal 
network. Since we saw patterns of network mappings among a certain amount of people and 
the timestamps indicated nearly the same time period, we were able to understand network 
mappings which are automatically mapped with a computer in the internal domain.  
Findings presented in Table 12 show that documents that are uploaded on organizations’ 
sites are full of compromising data. The information we managed to gather from metadata 
is intrusive and it can be used for building cyber-attacks against a particular organization. 
We managed to fingerprint many assets of the Ministry A’s internal network without having 
access to it and we did not do any active scan. Hypothesis posed in this thesis is validated - 
those findings aid attackers in picking targets and attacking techniques more accurately. 
Attack vectors are discussed more deeply in section 4.4. 
4.3.2 Analysis of Ministry B 
The final stage of the fingerprinting method is the analysis of extracted information which 
were gathered in previous stages. Table 13 presents conclusive results of the Ministry B 
metadata analysis based on manual observation and analysis of the extracted metadata. 
Documents which we managed to gather from Ministry B website did not contain very many 
Microsoft Office documents. This is one of the reasons why we did not get that much infor-
mation about their internal services, printers, or assets. Metadata analysis is depending 
highly on the document formats a particular website contains, most compromising are 
OOXML documents. 
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Table 13: Summary of metadata analysis about Ministry B 
Findings Description of findings 
Detected services 
 
 
Internal 
We detected possible e-mail services. One 
extracted local file path describes an e-mail 
client application, which lets us assume 
what e-mail server is most probably used.   
Doman namespace We detected one possible internal domain 
name from a PDF’s “title” metadata field. 
Servers We were unable to detect servers.  
Software, application One of the most used software for docu-
ment creation procces is Microsoft Office 
2013. We detected the usage of this soft-
ware among many users and timestamps in-
formation confirms that this software is ac-
tively used. Furthermore, we detected that 
many users use other PDF reader than 
Adobe. Also for PDF creation, several or-
ganization workers use Multi-functional 
printer for generating PDF documents. 
Software information that we were able to 
extract from PDF documents gives infor-
mation about software portfolio of that or-
ganization. 
Printer information We detected one printer name from MS Of-
fice documents. The name of the printer in-
dicates that it is directly connected to the 
computer.  
We determined that many Multi-functional 
printers were used for generating PDF doc-
uments. Most popular were “Canon” print-
ers.   
Personnel information, roles  We were able to detect 116 unique 
usernames that exist in metadata, also pos-
sible website content managers. 
Relationships between persons, companies, 
organizations.  
Connections between other organizations, 
and between persons and other organiza-
tions or companies are detected. 
We found many other companies names in 
metadata fields which means we received 
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knowledge about who the cooperative part-
ners for that organization are. We identified 
8 unique organization or company names. 
Operating systems The majority of the detected OS were Win-
dows 7 64 (Ultimate 64x), also some occur-
rences of Windows Vista Ultimate Home 
Edition x64. 
The number of Windows 7 information in 
metadata in comparison with timestamp 
and author information lets us state with 
certainty that the organization uses Win-
dows 7 operating system.   
Due to the lack of MS Office documents existing on Ministry B website, we did not detect 
any server information from the metadata. However, high occurrences of PDF documents 
on the website gives us a pretty good overview of the software portfolio and their versions 
that are used in that organization. This information matched with organization workers can 
give an overview of user software running on their computers. Attackers can select exploits 
and prepare malware based on that information. Theoretically, it is possible to detect soft-
ware’s update cycles in organizations. We observed that one of the document author names 
was actively in metadata. Comparing the same author name with software version and put-
ting this information into timeline, one can understand the possible update times. Although 
were not able to detect update cycles, that amount of PDF documents gave good prerequi-
sites.  
We observed that the PDF documents contain in its metadata fields (in “producer”, “creator 
tool” fields) accurate information about software and its versions which creates it. Also, 
those fields tends to include operating system information. Some of the examples: 
 PDF-XChange 4.0.193.0 (Windows Seven Ultimate x64 (Build 7600)) 
 Acrobat PDFWriter 4.0 for Windows NT 
 PDF-XChange (PDFTools4.exe v4.0.0212.0000) (Windows) 
Software information not only exposes software names and version information, it also ex-
poses vulnerabilities that the computer where the document was created may have. For ex-
ample, in the above list of software “PDF-XChange 4.0.193.0” version shows that it is out-
dated and has vulnerabilities. Comparing version information, author name, and timestamps 
we can detect an outdated computer which aids attackers in selecting attacks or exploits for 
the infected computer. We detected that users had been using that vulnerable “PDF-
XChange” application for three years.  
4.3.3 Analysis of Ministry C 
The final stage of the fingerprinting method is analysis of extracted information which were 
gathered from previous stages. Table 14 presents conclusive results of the Ministry C.  
Table 14: Summary of metadata analysis about Ministry C 
Findings Description of findings 
Detected services Internal:  
Detected file sharing services, most likely a 
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file server, working on Windows operating 
system. 
Doman namespace Detected two possible internal domain 
names. 
Servers We were able to detect 5 different print 
servers. In addition, we detected a potential 
internal e-mail server.  
Software, application From local file path information we de-
tected an E-mail client application. Most 
frequently used software for that organiza-
tion was Microsoft Office 2010. 
For PDF documents creation, Microsoft 
2010 Word and Adobe InDesign are most 
used applications.   
Since we analyzed a large amount of PDF 
documents we gained good visibility of 
software portfolio used for creating elec-
tronic documents. 
Printer information This organization uses multiple manufac-
turer’s printers and it seems that printers are 
not consolidated to one vendor.  
Most of the printers are connected to one 
certain print server which is probably one 
of the main print servers.  
Printer names are not associated with phys-
ical locations in this organization. One 
printer name indicates a different depart-
ment.   
Personnel information, roles  Detected 160 unique author names which 
can potentially be usernames for local com-
puters. We detected two possible Web con-
tent managers whose names occur most fre-
quently in metadata. 
Relationships between persons, companies, 
organizations.  
Detected connections between several co-
operation partners. In addition, we detected 
links with a company that probably pro-
vides translating services for our observed 
organization. 
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Operating system Most used operating system is Windows 
and most likely the version is 7 64x. In ad-
dition, we detected some occurrences of 
Macintosh. 
We detected many occurrences of Macin-
tosh computers having Adobe commercial 
products, such as InDesign and Illustrator 
installed in their systems. It can be assumed 
that these computers belong to designers or 
editors. 
Since the observed website contained many PDF documents, we got a good overview of the 
various software used in their organization. Some of the software names contained infor-
mation in which the software’s website address was presented. For example: 
 PDF Printer / www.bullzip.com / FPG / Freeware Edition (max 10 users)  
This data gives additional information for attackers for preparing exploits or sending fake 
download links to “update” the PDF software. Furthermore, the software that is mentioned 
above is allowed to be used only by 10 users in a corporation, so if the number of users is 
higher then the organization is violating the software usage policies. We detected 5 different 
users for that software. However, we analyzed documents which were available in public 
websites; therefore, since most of the documents are created and stored on internal networks 
then software usage’s policy violation might be possible. This information can be used for 
blackmailing the organization or cause reputational damage.     
The majority of the MS documents were in binary format which means we were not able to 
gather much custom information. Path information which were extracted, contained mainly 
information about the network share name and not full path address to server. For example: 
 S:\mpo\2_büroo\Teemad\Õigusaktid, juhendid\Rakendusaktid\2017\VORMID\  
 P:\Viisastatistika\  
Analysis presented in Section 4.3 tables above showed that organization fingerprinting de-
pends highly on the document formats which are hosted in the observed website, and the 
amounts. Most meaningful metadata for fingerprinting basis were extracted form MS 
OOXML documents. From the Ministry A presentation document we were able to detect 17 
different embedded spreadsheet documents which had preserved metadata. One of the doc-
uments could potentially expose significant amount of compromising information. In addi-
tion, PDF documents which are often known as a metadata strict document format, con-
tained compromising data about users, local paths, printers, applications, and their versions.     
From the observed websites we detected documents that were originating from other com-
panies and contained compromising metadata. We noticed this situation in one of the ob-
served organizations’s website. This shows that when metadata is not properly moved it can 
advance to unknown places and the original document author cannot control that flow. 
We determined links between documents authors and organizations. Many documents of 
other companies were uploaded to observed websites which raises many questions. This 
information might possibly expose partner companies’ names, giving some additional attack 
vectors to attackers. For example, sending spoofed e-mails under the partner’s name to the 
targeted organization. 
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The information which documents’ metadata gives about an organization is significant. 
Documents’ metadata not only describes the content of the document but also the environ-
ment where it was created. The information exposes much many details about the organiza-
tion’s internal assets, detects vulnerable targets, shows ways to approach users through links 
and relationships with other people and organizations. The results shown in this section 
along with the raw metadata in Appendixes are presented to the responsible CIO-s of ob-
served ministries. 
4.4 Attack vectors 
When planning to attack someone, it has to be known who the target is and where they are 
located. Before attacking, cyber criminals often conduct OSINT for gathering information 
about the target and its assets – it is called reconnaissance stage. In the same stage, attackers 
could use information hosted on the target’s websites’ metadata. As presented in the tables 
of the previous chapter, metadata provides several pieces of information that can be take 
into account when building attacks. In the following section we describe some of the attack 
vectors metadata can provide based on the tables shown in previous chapter.  
Document author information which metadata exposes helps attackers to learn a possible 
target name who to attack in order to gain access to corporate networks. Furthermore, ex-
posing usernames through metadata makes attackers’ lives much easier gaining hidden 
working personnel names from metadata. Some organizations do not publish their workers 
names and information on websites, however, the information is still there in the documents 
metadata. For example, in Figure 35 there is shown the metadata of a spreadsheet which 
was downloaded from nsa.gov website. The metadata exposes NSA personnel name which, 
for instance, is a very good starting point for any attacker to start searching intelligence 
about the exposed name from social media.   
 
Figure 35: Metadata disclosed a secret personnel name   
Names give options for potential spear-phishing attacks as well as brute-forces attacks on 
the web services. In Figure 36, results from a simple google search are shown that expose 
possible webmail login pages. Comparing extracted usernames to names which are leaked 
already on the internet (for instance Yahoo or Myspace data breach), the attacker could have 
a possible password for attempting to log on to the targeted organization’s services. What is 
more, usernames can be used for a denial of service attack, for example, locking user ac-
counts by generating failed login attempts on the services available on the internet. For in-
stance, users cannot use webmail for a certain time since their accounts are locked.  
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Figure 36: Webmail logins, place for brute-forcing or denial of service attacks 
Internal information, such as domain names, are important for preparing attacks like phish-
ing e-mails or for malware preparation. For example, if an attacker wants to be sure that the 
victim is located on the targeted organization’s networks, he could prepare malware in a 
way that it checks system where it runs (checking domain name) and executing if it is on 
the target system. In addition, internal domain name is good for preparing fake login pages 
and lure targeted organization personnel to visit those pages.   
Server information exposing targets inside the internal network means the attacker does not 
need to do any extra movement. If the attacker gains access to the internal network, he does 
not need to start scanning the network because he already has knowledge of the file servers’ 
location. Old documents which are uploaded on target websites often contain information 
about old servers and assets. This information can also be used by attackers. For instance, 
old file servers are often running for archiving purposes or for backups, however, their op-
erating systems are vulnerable and not patched which makes them easy targets. 
The links between organizations give attackers information about potential partner organi-
zations. Again, this information can be used for sending phishing e-mails. Furthermore, in-
formation on partners gives opportunities to conduct watering-hole attacks, infecting part-
ners’ webpages with specific malware and wait for audience form the targeted organization 
only. Also, infecting or overtaking partners’ infrastructure, which is probably not so secure, 
and then sending e-mails from the legitimate e-mail server. Those are common APT prac-
tices and tactics that are utilized. Sometimes partner companies manage some of their of-
fered services or hardware over Virtual Private Network (VPN). Should the attackers take 
over the partners’ networks which are most probably not so well protected, they could get 
backdoor access to target systems. 
When checking timestamps on documents and adding software version information, we can 
determine the software version number in that particular time frame. When the same user is 
uploading documents in a certain period and we build a timeline of timestamp information 
and software versions, we could possibly detect software’s update cycles of the organiza-
tion. Knowing which software runs in target systems helps attackers select exploits or pre-
pare themselves for privilege escalation if the target computer is already infected. The ver-
sion information shows the organization’s overall update policies, whether software ver-
sions are consolidated, if they are vulnerable, and what type of software is running in the 
systems. 
In Chapter 4 we were able to detect possible links between working personnel. We detected 
in metadata persons’ names who exist most frequently in metadata fields which give indi-
cation that those persons might be the website content managers who upload the documents. 
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Since those persons always check the documents’ content before uploading, their names 
appear in metadata. Those content managers are valuable targets for attackers, since they 
have access to webservers and permissions to upload data there. Infecting website content 
manager computers with malware gives the attacker permissions to upload, for example, 
PHP shells on target websites and use that webserver as a bridge for data exfiltration. 
Those are some of the attack vectors the attackers could execute based on findings in Chap-
ter 4. As we can notice, the metadata provides significant information for attackers and helps 
understand the target and its systems. The next chapter presents different options on how 
this issue can be mitigated and how to remove metadata from documents. 
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5 Mitigation 
In the previous chapters we discussed the existence of metadata in documents and the issues 
it might bring. The current chapter focuses on mitigating this problem and discusses the 
methods for removing metadata. 
To mitigate harm and risks metadata can bring, it has to be removed from documents. Re-
moving metadata from document is not a very difficult activity. Microsoft Office has built 
in metadata removal tool “Inspector” which removes most of the hidden information from 
documents. Acrobat reader also has metadata sanitize functionalities to remove metadata 
from PDF documents. Even though those softwares are normally accessible for users, 
metadata still exists in documents. Most people are not fully aware of the metadata exist-
ence, so they can unwittingly send confidential information to outside of their organization 
or publish it on the Internet where everyone has access to it. 
In paper [9], there discussed that for handling metadata issues in organizations, a policy 
regarding metadata has to be in place. That policy should include several aspects such as 
education of the users and raising awareness. By our observation, from Chapter 4 it can be 
clearly understood that almost every document which was analyzed contained metadata that 
could be used on fingerprinting basis. We can assume that the document creators are not 
actually aware that the documents they create contain some extra information which in some 
cases can be sensitive and dangerous. Introducing metadata’s nature and its possible con-
tents is one way to start removing the information before publishing. 
Document “Inspector”, a built-in MS Office tool for removing metadata and inspecting it, 
gives feedback about which extra data is located inside document and a choice option 
whether to keep the information or remove it. For instance, analyzing this thesis paper with 
document inspector (navigating to File menu and choosing Inspect Document) it detects 
comments, author information, embeddings, and template names. Figure 37 presents docu-
ment inspector’s output of this thesis paper. 
 
Figure 37: Inspecting the current thesis paper with document inspector 
Since OOXML documents might contain custom information in its data files, those tools 
are not always capable of removing all of the sensitive information. One possible way to 
make sure that metadata does not leak information, is to make and use a special template. 
In the template one can insert prefilled information showing up in metadata or just erase all 
 59 
 
and leave it blank. If a document is created, those fields are empty and custom information 
most likely does not exist. 
To maximize metadata removal, the document can be cleaned with document “inspector” 
and then saved into another format: to PDF or Rich Text Format (RTF). However, those 
solutions need manual interaction by users. If the user forgets to remove metadata or convert 
the file to other format, it is still exposed. Since much of the document sharing is done by 
e-mails, FTP servers, USB drives, or by cloud services, and it can be intense and in huge 
amounts, then this solution might be not the most efficient. To mitigate those issues, several 
commercial solutions are available for protecting documents. Microsoft has a solution 
named RMS [30] which helps to protect electronic assets and it is capable of protecting data 
on all important devices. There are also several toolkits for anonymizing documents. For 
example, the PayneGroups Metadata Assistant [31] which can be configured to remove 
metadata from Word and PDF files on demand or automatically (i. e. when files are sent by 
email to other parties). 
If document authors see the metadata and are aware of its existence in documents, they will 
most probably remove it. Simson L. Garfinkel [26] proposed an idea to mitigate metadata 
information leakages: ”A better approach would be to modify tools so that the underlying 
data model is in line with what’s presented in the user interface—that is, by making it harder 
for users to produce documents with hidden information”. If a document is edited, one can 
see the metadata in its interface and is aware of its existence which might mitigate the aware-
ness problems.   
This chapter discussed metadata removing approaches. Removing metadata from docu-
ments is not a very difficult activity. The question is about the awareness and missing 
metadata policies or procedures. The next chapter presents the conclusion of this thesis pa-
per. 
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6 Conclusions 
In this thesis, metadata of documents hosted on public websites were analyzed, in order to 
extract information for fingerprinting basis and detect information that aids in carrying out 
cyber attacks against observed organizations. 
We observed three Estonian governmental organizations’ documents that were uploaded on 
their websites. We gathered these documents into our local system and conducted metadata 
extraction and analysis. In Chapter 3 we introduced some novel methods and techniques 
how to carry out this study. In Chapter 4, we presented the results of the conducted research. 
Our analysis demonstrated that metadata existed in almost all the documents that we man-
aged to download and analyze. We processed 2643 documents, from which only 12 docu-
ments had metadata properly removed. All the other documents contained metadata fields 
which describe the environment where the document was created or modified. Metadata 
extracted from the observed organizations’ websites gave us insights to internal networks, 
internal servers, software and their versions, physical locations of people, internal services, 
usernames, vulnerable computers and software, and other information. This information was 
obtained simply by analyzing documents’ metadata, no other activities or network scans 
were done. Metadata is intrusive and can be used as the pre-stage for conducting cyber at-
tacks. The outcome of the metadata extraction and analysis validates our hypothesis that the 
documents uploaded on the Estonian governmental websites contain compromising infor-
mation that could be used for cyber attacks. Since the compromising information is available 
for everyone on public websites, it is nearly impossible to determine whether that infor-
mation is used for conducting devastating attacks or not. 
The high number of metadata existence in documents reflects the need for awareness about 
metadata vulnerabilities. People are not aware of the metadata existence in electronic docu-
ments and might unwillingly leak information about themselves or the organization. 
Metadata removal processes are not difficult and the Office applications have metadata re-
moval tools built-in; however, those tools are not often used due to the lack of awareness.   
This is the first study in Estonia that aims to clean up Estonian governments’ webpages from 
documents’ metadata. We presented the results of our analysis to the responsible CIO’s to 
raise awareness about metadata security issues. Talking about metadata and demonstrating 
its capabilities are a first step in mitigating metadata exposures. 
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Appendix 
The appendix includes all the additional material developed through this thesis. It is divided 
into 5 parts. They are the following:  
I. Office files represented in EE domain. This appendix describes methods collecting 
statically information about existent of Offices files in Estonia domain.  
II. OOXML metadata files core.xml and app.xml. This appendix presents contents 
of typical OOXML document files which contains metadata.  
III. Ministry A extracted raw metadata. This appendix describes extracted raw 
metadata which were gathered form Ministry A documents.  
IV. Ministry B extracted raw metadata. This appendix describes extracted raw 
metadata which were gathered form Ministry B documents. 
V. Ministry C extracted raw metadata. This appendix describes extracted raw 
metadata which were gathered form Ministry C documents. 
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I. Office files represented in EE domain 
The following research was conducted to understand which document formats exists mostly 
in Estonia websites – in .ee top level domain. 
Research was conducted 19.02.18 using Google search engine and its features which support 
queries of specific file type or extension. 
Example of querying multiple file types together from Estonia domain is shown below:  
site:ee ext:doc | ext:docx | ext:rtf | ext:xls | ext:xlsx | ext:ppt | ext:pptx | ext:odf | ext:odp| 
ext:ods| ext:pdf | ext: bdoc 
Description of used google search operators: 
site:ee – Google advanced search operator, is used for searching from a specific domain or 
website. In our case it represents querying from EE domain. 
ext – Google advanced search operator, represents extension modifier, works same way as 
file type.    
| - Google advanced search operator, representing logical OR.  
Since we were interested in which file type is the most popular in Estonia domain, we are 
building query each file type separately: site:.ee ext:doc, after that we are marking down 
response results and take the next file type (for example site:.ee ext:docx). The following 
illustrates query described before: site:ee ext:docx Google finds 41200 positive matches:  
 
 
 
Figure 38: Gathering statistical information about documents occurrences in EE domain 
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Queries conducted:  
  
    Table 15: Query responses 
Query File extension Count 
site:ee ext: doc doc 277000 
site:ee ext:docx docx 41200 
site:ee ext:rtf rtf 28200 
site:ee ext:xls xls 43000 
site:ee ext:xlsx xlsx 13400 
site:ee ext:ppt ppt 18100 
site:ee ext:pptx pptx 6200 
site:ee ext:odt odt 2000 
site:ee ext:odp odp 548 
site:ee ext:ods ods 951 
site:ee ext:bdoc bdoc 1080 
site:ee ext:ddoc ddoc 811 
site:ee ext:pdf pdf 4220000 
 
For getting a better visual overview of document types on Estonian domain, PDF format is 
not included in the chart: 
 
Figure 39: Graph of document occurrences in EE domain, PDF files are excluded 
The most popular documents which one can find from websites are PDF documents, fol-
lowed by different types of Microsoft Office documents.  
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II. OOXML metadata files core.xml and app.xml 
This appendix presents two XML files which are found in every OOXML and which con-
tains metadata. Those files are core.xml and app.xml.   
The Word Documents were downloaded from TTU site: http://cloud.ld.ttu.ee/idu0010/Por-
tals/0/Harjutustunnid/Financial%20Analysis.docx and opened with 7zip program to exam-
ine metadata XML files inside OOXML structure.  The file name under observation is Fi-
nancial Analysis.docx and core.xml, app.xml are presented below:  
 
Figure 40: Content of core.xml file 
 
Figure 41: Content of app.xml 
 
 
1. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="true"?>   
2.    
3. -<cp:coreProperties xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-ins-
tance" xmlns:dcmitype="http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/term
s/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:cp="http://schemas.openxmlfor-
mats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties">   
4.    
5. <dc:creator>superkasutaja</dc:creator>   
6. <cp:lastModifiedBy>superkasutaja</cp:lastModifiedBy>   
7. <cp:revision>1</cp:revision>   
8. <dcterms:created xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2013-10-30T15:08:00Z</dcterms:created>   
9. <dcterms:modified xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2013-10-30T15:16:00Z</dcterms:modified>   
10. </cp:coreProperties>  
 
1. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="true"?>   
2. -<Properties xmlns:vt="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/docProps-
VTypes" xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/extended-pro-
perties">   
3. <Template>Normal</Template>   
4. <TotalTime>8</TotalTime>   
5. <Pages>25</Pages>   
6. <Words>2873</Words>   
7. <Characters>16665</Characters>   
8. <Application>Microsoft Office Word</Application>   
9. <DocSecurity>0</DocSecurity>   
10. <Lines>138</Lines>   
11. <Paragraphs>38</Paragraphs>   
12. <ScaleCrop>false</ScaleCrop>   
13. <Company>Tallinn University of Technology</Company>   
14. <LinksUpToDate>false</LinksUpToDate>   
15. <CharactersWithSpaces>19500</CharactersWithSpaces>   
16. <SharedDoc>false</SharedDoc>   
17. <HyperlinksChanged>false</HyperlinksChanged>   
18. <AppVersion>12.0000</AppVersion>   
19. </Properties>  
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III. Ministry A extracted raw metadata 
The following tables present extracted metadata from the documents of Ministry A. 
Metadata is extracted utilizing fingerprinting method which was described in Chapter 3.  
Information which is presented in the tables below are unique values, duplicates are re-
moved.  
Table 16: Ministry A local and network paths: 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 17: Ministry A Server paths 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 18: Ministry A list of URLs found in metadata 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 19: Ministry A list of software’s and applications which were extracted from PDF 
documents 
Creator Tool Producer 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 20: Ministry A company and printer information, extracted from Microsoft Office 
documents 
Company Printer name 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
 Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
 Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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IV. Ministry B extracted raw metadata 
The following tables present extracted metadata from the documents of Ministry B. 
Metadata is extracted utilizing fingerprinting method which was described in Chapter 3.  
Information which is presented in the tables below are unique values, duplicates are re-
moved.  
Table 21: Ministry B Local and network paths 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 22: Ministry B list of software’s and applications which were extracted from PDF 
documents 
Producer Creator Tool 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
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Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons   
Table 23: Ministry B company and printer information, extracted from Microsoft Office 
and PDF documents 
Company Printer 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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V. Ministry C extracted raw metadata 
The following tables present extracted metadata from the documents of Ministry C. 
Metadata is extracted utilizing fingerprinting method which was described in Chapter 3.  
Information which is presented in the tables below are unique values, duplicates are re-
moved.  
Table 24: Ministry C local and network paths 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 25: Ministry C list of software’s and applications which were extracted from PDF 
documents 
Producer Creator Tool 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Table 26: Ministry C company and printer information, extracted from Microsoft Office 
documents 
Company Printer 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
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Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons 
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons  
Raw metadata is removed for privacy reasons  
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